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ABSTRACT 
How do emergency managers communicate vital life-safety information when 
disaster strikes and the power goes out, sometimes for extended periods? Time 
and again, our power grid, aging and stretched beyond its intended capacity, has 
experienced failures. Power outages can quickly shift from being annoying to 
deadly—especially when temperatures are extreme—particularly for elderly and 
other vulnerable populations.  
Emergency managers will be able to use the findings of this research to 
communicate critical information to the community, even in the direst 
circumstances, without relying on a “techno-fix.” A structured focused 
comparison of three disasters revealed that a “high-tech, low-tech, no-tech” 
framework can be implemented successfully and inexpensively. Throughout the 
three disasters studied, communications methods in the high-tech, low-tech, and 
no-tech areas were successful in communicating with the public.  
The thesis recommends that every community be prepared with this three-
pronged approach. To go a step further, the study recommends that FEMA 
consider incorporating the “high-low-no-tech” approach into its COOP (Continuity 
of Operations Plan) template, which currently assumes that communications 
systems—phones, Internet, email, two-way radios—will be operational within 12 
hours of activation, an optimistic assumption. A sample implementation plan with 
cost estimates is included. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
“All systems, all vestiges of modern living — communications, 
power, water — all are down. There is no way to communicate with 
the people.” 
 
Philippine Interior Secretary Mar Roxas,  
following Typhoon Haiyan, 2013 
 
Communicating important information to the public during disasters is a core 
objective for emergency managers. But how can emergency managers 
communicate with their community when plugged-in forms of communication are 
not available to a large number of people?  
Power outages frequently occur, and often accompany major crises, 
particularly natural disasters such as severe weather events. Thus, during crises, 
communications are often severely hampered—just when emergency managers 
have the greatest need to communicate with the community. 
Despite the preponderance of power outages, coupled with this important 
communications need, a review of the literature revealed few existing 
recommendations on what tactics could help emergency managers communicate 
with the public when the lights go out. In fact, a number of reports concluded that 
“something else” would be needed when the power goes out, but few, if any, 
went on to suggest what that “something” might be.  
This project filled the gap by researching what specific solutions have 
successfully been used to communicate critical information to the public during 
emergencies involving major blackouts. This research project reviewed and 
analyzed three crises that involved major blackouts and subsequent 
communications problems: 
• Multi-state blackout, northeast U.S., 2003  
• Hurricane Katrina, Gulf Coast, U.S., 2005  
• Triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear), Japan, 2011  
 xv 
The research project led to the discovery of a three-tiered framework, 
consisting of “high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech” communications strategies. 
Emergency managers can leverage the high usage of mobile devices and 
exploit it for emergency communications purposes. Assuming emergency 
managers have access to backup generators, they can send out messages via 
social media channels. governments in the disaster-affected areas of Japan’s 
triple disaster now consider social networks to be a valuable communications tool 
in disasters. 
It was clear across the three cases that, whatever the situation, what 
people needed most was extremely localized information. Across the cases, 
hyper-local community radio stations were among the top sources of extremely 
local information that people needed most. In addition, as conditions improved, 
hyper-local radio transitioned to sources of support and comfort, thus serving as 
vital lifelines to connect communities.  
When all else fails, local governments must be prepared to go backward 
and use old-fashioned methods to reach people with information. In all three 
cases, people used their ingenuity to figure out ways to get information out, 
including handwritten posters, old-school flyers, and bullhorns. The focus should 
be on getting information to the places where people naturally gather following 
disasters, e.g., corner stores, evacuation centers, gas stations.  
This research study filled a noticeable gap in the literature and in the fields 
of emergency communications and management. This study will help emergency 
managers prepare for the next inevitable power outage as well as the direst 
circumstances.  
None of these methods is revolutionary, so what is new here? What is 
new is the proposal that emergency managers in local jurisdictions proactively 
prepare for the worst scenarios, by making preparations for communicating with 
their public, via the “high-tech, low-tech, no-tech” combination. Key elements for 
success include: 
 xvi 
• Focusing on the hyper-local information that people need. 
• Flexibility to quickly adapt and use those tools and channels that 
are up and working. 
• Nurturing and encouraging private efforts to help in response and 
relief efforts.  
• Preparing for the worst. 
• Not relying on a “techno-fix.”  
Such preparations will give emergency managers the confidence to know 
that, no matter the severity of the incident, they will be able to provide essential 
information to their communities and improve safety, resilience, and survival 
rates. 
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I. HIGH-TECH, LOW-TECH, NO-TECH: COMMUNICATIONS 
STRATEGIES DURING BLACKOUTS  
On July 29, 2012, a series of straight-line “derecho”1 windstorms hit the 
mid-Atlantic region of the United States. In the National Capital Region (NCR), 
many residents lost electricity, more than one million in Virginia alone. Verizon, 
which manages all 911 services in the region, suffered loss of its backup 
generators at two critical centers, cutting off 911 services to 1.5 million 
residents.2  
Many in the region lost telephone service, both landline and mobile. With 
the community’s loss of telephone, Internet, and electric power, emergency 
managers lost the ability to share critical life/safety information with the 
community. This all occurred during record-setting high temperatures. Hundreds 
of thousands of residents were without power and air-conditioning, for multiple 
days. Elderly residents and those with limited mobility or health problems were 
not able to call for help, could not be directed to a cooling center, and could not 
receive critical life/safety information.  
This crisis was not an anomaly.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Power outages are common occurrences that affect all communities. 
Major blackouts in the U.S. in recent years have resulted from a variety of 
causes, including massive flooding (Grand Forks, North Dakota, 1997), rolling 
blackouts (California, 2001), multi-state power outage (Ohio and seven other 
 
 
1 “Derecho” is a series of severe, widespread, straight-line windstorms. 
2 State Corporation Commission, Staff Report of Final Findings and Recommendations, 
Case no. PUC-2012-00042, in the Matter of Investigating 911 Emergency Call Service Outages 
and Problems (Richmond, Virginia: Commonwealth of Virginia, 2013), 
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/newsrel/c_911out_13.pdf. 
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U.S. states and two Canadian provinces, 2003), hurricanes (Louisiana and 
Mississippi, 2005), and severe storms (Superstorm Sandy, Atlantic coast, 2012; 
ice storm, New Hampshire, 2008).   
Blackouts can also be created by causes other than weather; during the 
past two decades, non-disaster-related blackouts have increased 124 percent.3 
Time and again, our power grid, aging and stretched beyond its intended 
capacity, has experienced failures. Power outages can quickly shift from being 
annoying to deadly—especially when temperatures are extreme—creating 
dangerous life/safety situations, particularly for elderly and other vulnerable or 
dependent populations.  
The point is, crippling power outages can, and do, occur.  
When the power goes out: During crises, people need information: about 
the crisis itself; where to obtain food or water; where to find shelter; how to find 
loved ones; how to receive help or help others; and how to prevent or treat crisis-
related disease. Our society is dependent on electricity-powered information 
channels, and is at a loss when they are not working.  
People receive information primarily from methods that require electric 
power in some form. This includes traditional media, such as television news, 
radio, and print media, as well as digital information sources, including via mobile 
devices, the use of which is spreading rapidly. Even newspapers require 
electricity to set type and run printing presses.  
But what happens when these tools are not available? Key government 
facilities have generator backup and emergency managers can send information, 
but during major power outages, residents quickly lose the ability to receive this 
valuable information.  
3 Such blackouts have increased from 41 (1991–1995) to 92 (2001–2005). Source: Thom 
Patterson, “U.S. Electricity Blackouts Skyrocketing,” CNN, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/TECH/innovation/08/09/smart.grid/index.html. 
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Help for emergency managers needed: Communicating important 
information to the public during disasters is a core objective for emergency 
managers. But how can emergency managers communicate with their target 
publics when plugged-in forms of communication are not available to a large 
number of people? This problem is viewed through the lens of a practitioner with 
nearly thirty years of experience working in public relations and crisis 
communications, with more than ten years working in local emergency 
management. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
During large-scale, sustained power failures, the problem is that the ability 
of emergency managers to communicate important life/safety information to the 
public is greatly hindered. To begin to identify potential solutions to this important 
problem, it was useful to identify three key problem areas related to public 
communications during severe power outages. Two of these areas, numbers 1 
and 3, are related to the physical technology or infrastructure; area number 2 
reflects a broader need during emergencies. 
Area Number 1: Fragile Communication Channels. During emergency 
responses that include major power outages, emergency managers frequently 
find many communication channels on which they normally rely are not usable. 
For example, television stations may be airing news coverage, but households 
without power cannot view the broadcast. Emergency managers can post useful 
information on the locality’s website or send it by email, but households without 
power do not have access to the Internet. 
Area Number 2: Mismatched Information. In times of crisis, people 
have a need for hyper-local information. Mainstream media is often focused on 
larger, more sensational aspects of the overall crisis, at a time when individuals 
need specifics on where to get local help for critical items such as water, food, 
shelter or medication. 
 3 
Area Number 3: Infrastructure Collapse. When infrastructure has been 
destroyed and normal communication methods are disabled, emergency 
managers will struggle to communicate vital information with the public. For 
example, a city’s Town Hall and Emergency Operations Center may have backup 
generator power, but what if Town Hall and the entire downtown area have been 
washed away by a severe storm or leveled by terrorists?  
During severe power outages, emergency managers face these three core 
issues as they work to fulfill a core mission objective: sharing critical information 
with the public.  
C. BACKGROUND AND NEED 
Power outages frequently occur, and often accompany major crises, 
particularly natural disasters such as severe weather events. Thus, during crises, 
communications are often severely hampered—just when emergency managers 
have the greatest need to communicate with the community. 
Despite the preponderance of power outages, coupled with this important 
communications need, a review of the literature revealed few existing plans or 
recommendations on what tactics could help emergency managers communicate 
with the public when the lights go out.4 During a U.S. House of Representatives 
hearing on the response to Hurricane Katrina, Representative Tammy Baldwin 
(D-WI) asked, “It sounds like it can happen again. How many local governments 
have a communications plan when everything fails?”5 
 
4 Examples include: Kentucky Public Service Commission, Ike and Ice: Report on the 
September 2008 Wind Storm and the January 2009 Ice Storm (Lexington, Kentucky: State of 
Kentucky [2009]), http://psc.ky.gov/IkeIce/Report.pdf, Cabinet Office, “Resilient Communications,” 
Government of the United Kingdom, https://www.gov.uk/resilient-communications. 
5 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [2006]). 
http://www.gpoacess.gov/congress/index.html. 
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While it is difficult to find articulated plans, the literature reveals instances 
in which emergency managers have successfully addressed the three key areas 
of concern.  
Area Number 1: Fragile Communication Channels. Some communities 
have had success using newer technologies, such as emergency text alerting, 
which can be transmitted more easily than a mobile phone call, and social media 
channels. People have found ways to recharge mobile devices, including using 
their cars, or facilities with backup generators.  
Area Number 2: Mismatched Information. Local radio has proven an 
effective means of getting hyper-local information to the community. For 
example, local radio was called the “most effective tool” in the aftermath of the 
2010 Haiti earthquake, to provide valuable information to the victims of the 
disaster.6  
Area Number 3: Infrastructure Collapse. When all else fails, emergency 
managers have found ways to use old-school methods to get information to 
those who need it. For example, when a massive flood wiped out Grand Forks, 
North Dakota in 1997, emergency managers printed old-fashioned newsletters to 
share important information with thousands of people living in FEMA trailers.7  
 
 
6 Knight Foundation, “Lessons from Haiti: Media, Information System and Communities,” 
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, http://www.knightfoundation.org/publications/media-
information-system-and-communities-lessons-h. 
7 City of Grand Forks, Grand Forks Flood Disaster and Recovery Lessons Learned, City of 
Grand Forks, North Dakota, (2011), http://www.grandforksgov.com/Reports/lessonslearned.pdf. 
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The literature includes many reports that acknowledged the many 
communications problems that communities face during major power outages.8 
In fact, a number of reports concluded that “something else” would be needed 
when the power goes out, but few, if any, went on to suggest what that 
“something” might be.  
This project filled the gap by identifying what specific solutions have 
successfully been used to communicate critical information to the public during 
emergencies involving major blackouts.  
D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to look for ways that communities have 
successfully addressed the three core issue areas, in order to help local 
emergency managers improve their ability to communicate important information 
with the public during severe power outages. The project focused on blackouts 
that go far beyond the routine inconvenience of a two-hour power outage; severe 
blackouts are of a sufficiently large scope to impact people’s health and survival.  
Effective public communication is a core goal of emergency management; 
yet normal methods used to achieve these results are frequently hampered or 
rendered unusable by major power outages. To prepare for such incidents, 
emergency managers need contingency plans in order to be able to convey 
urgent information to their target publics.  
Since U.S. communities have a lot of experience managing through 
blackouts, this researcher began this project assuming that it would be easy to 
find emergency operations plans and reports that address this problem. As a 
review of literature revealed a dearth of such plans, the effort then turned to 
looking for successful implementation of solutions to address the three core 
8 Examples include Lois Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in 
the Great East Japan Earthquake (London, England: Internews Europe [2013]), 
http://www.internews.eu/docs/Publications/InternewsEurope_Report_Japan_Connecting_the_last
_mile_Japan_2013.pdf.; James Garnett and Alexander Kouzmin, “Communicating Throughout 
Katrina: Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Communication,” Public 
Administration Review 67, no. S1 (December, 2007), 171–188. http://bit.ly/VU2prb. 
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issues, in order to help emergency managers better plan for the inevitable power 
outage. 
This research project reviewed and analyzed three crises that involved 
major blackouts and subsequent communications problems. The cases are of 
different geographies, different scope, and different causes. All are relatively 
recent, as the wired nature of our modern society is a basic aspect of our modern 
world. All were catastrophic in nature, with significant loss of basic infrastructure, 
affecting millions of people and causing a total disruption of the community. And 
all have been written about widely. The three cases: 
• Multi-state blackout, northeast U.S., 2003—chosen to study a 
non-weather-related disaster that affected a wide swath of two 
nations and millions of victims.  
• Hurricane Katrina, Gulf Coast, U.S., 2005—chosen to study an 
example of a catastrophic disaster that devastated the 
infrastructure of a community.  
• Triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear), Japan, 2011—
chosen to study how another country managed through a 
devastating disaster. Japan and the U.S. have many similarities; 
both nations have a democratic government, a strong federal 
government, and are highly developed and technologically savvy. 
These three cases were chosen to provide diversity; they were diverse in 
terms of causation, geography, and scope. All three cases also had a number of 
similarities: all had significant communications breakdowns and difficulties getting 
critical information to people who needed it. All three incidents were catastrophic 
in nature, resulting in total disruption of the community. The research project 
examined these cases to look for successful examples of public emergency 




1. “High-Low-No-Tech” Framework 
The review of the literature (Chapter II) led to the discovery of a three-
tiered framework to address the three key areas of concern for public 
communications. This conceptual framework consists of “high-tech, low-tech, and 
no-tech”9 communications strategies: 
• High-tech methods were primarily those that reach mobile devices, 
the use of which is expanding rapidly in the U.S. These methods 
included using social media channels, which are very powerful 
ways to reach our increasingly wired society. These methods help 
address problem Area Number 1, fragile communications channels. 
• Low-tech methods included local community radio, which provide 
hyper-local information. People could receive broadcasts on radios 
powered by batteries, hand cranking, solar, or car batteries. These 
methods help address problem Area Number 2, Mismatched 
information. 
• No-tech options were used when all else failed and emergency 
managers were forced to return to old-school methods. For 
example, after Hurricane Katrina, firefighters distributed flyers 
throughout the Gulf Coast. Japanese newspaper reporters posted 
handwritten posters on public walls. When a massive 1997 flood 
wiped out Grand Forks, North Dakota, the town used old-fashioned 
newsletters to communicate with thousands of people living in 
FEMA trailers.10 These methods help address problem Area 
Number 3, infrastructure collapse. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech communication strategies 





9 With gratitude to CHDS alumna Tammy Spicer (cohort 1105/1106) for her suggestion of the 
phrase “high-tech, low-tech, no-tech.” 
10  City of Grand Forks, Grand Forks Flood Disaster and Recovery Lessons Learned, City of 
Grand Forks, North Dakota, (2011), http://www.grandforksgov.com/Reports/lessonslearned.pdf. 
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In order to answer this overarching question, the project included a 
number of supporting research questions to collect the data and analyze it within 
the conceptual framework; the entire list is located in Chapter III and is discussed 
in further detail in Appendix B. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
This research study filled a noticeable gap in the literature and in the fields 
of emergency communications and management. This study will help emergency 
managers prepare for the next inevitable power outage as well as the direst 
circumstances. Such preparations will give emergency managers the confidence 
to know that, no matter the severity of the incident, they will be able to provide 
essential information to their communities and improve safety, resilience, and 
survival rates.  
Future research will be able to advance this topic even further, drawing on 
new incidents, and looking at new technologies.  
G. UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
This chapter explained the goal, scope, and need of the thesis project, 
how it filled a gap in existing research, and how it used the “high-tech, low-tech, 
no-tech” conceptual framework to examine and analyze the data. 
Chapter II will review available literature that addresses the conceptual 
framework, and looks at three core communications issues that emergency 
managers face during major blackouts. This is followed by studies of three major 
crises involving emergency communications that were hampered by major power 
failures. The project uses the conceptual framework to provide an analysis and 
discussion of solutions to address the three key emergency communications 
areas studied. The study concludes with recommendations for local emergency 
managers.  
 9 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
One of the most important crisis management actions state 
government takes during an emergency is to provide information to 
the public.11 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Power outages are a common occurrence, including in the United States. 
While they can happen at any time, due to a variety of causes, power outages 
frequently accompany severe weather events, thus compounding the natural 
disaster. During major blackouts, just when people most need important 
life/safety information, emergency managers’ ability to convey this information is 
gravely hindered. 
The project began by searching for existing plans that address this need. 
Finding none, the research project turned to looking for data in existing literature.  
The literature review was conducted by looking at three core issues 
related to the problem of how to communicate important information to the public 
during major power outages. The first section addressed fragile communications 
channels; the second section looked at Mismatched information during crises; 
and the third section examined the total collapse of infrastructure, including 





11 Michigan Public Service Commission, Report on August 14th Blackout (Lansing, Michigan: 
State of Michigan [2003]), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc%5fblackout%5f77423%5f7.pdf. 
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B. AREA 1: FRAGILE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 
Many published research reports on the topic of catastrophic power 
outages focused on the infrastructure; many discussed communications 
problems.12 The few solutions offered are in the realm of high-tech channels, 
including social media.13 
A report from a group of European Chief Risk Officers is typical of this 
approach. It acknowledged that power outages “challenge society” when major 
infrastructure is affected, including communications. The report focused on the 
risks and impacts to infrastructure, business, and the economy, but did not 
address public communications solutions.14  
For example, the Risk Officers noted that many critical systems such as 
hospitals, sewage systems, and stock exchanges have generators; however, 
most are fueled for a maximum of a few days. Immediately after a blackout, it is 
not possible to purchase goods without cash, as electronic payments are not 
possible. Without electricity, gas station pumps do not work, leaving the public 
without fuel for cars and generators.15 The report acknowledged that loss of the 
ability to communicate is a negative.  
12 Examples include Michael Bloomberg, A Stronger, More Resilient New York (New York, 
New York: City of New York [2013]), http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml.; 
Michigan Public Service Commission, Report on August 14th Blackout; State of New Hampshire, 
December 11–12, 2008 Ice Storm: State Response After-Action Report (Concord, New 
Hampshire: New Hampshire Dept. of Safety, Homeland Security & Emergency Management 
[2009]), 
http://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/hsem/documents/dec08_icestorm_after_action_report.pdf.  
13 Examples include Rosabeth Moss Kanter, “Surprise! Four Strategies for Coping with 
Disruptions,” Harvard Business Review, http://blogs.hbr.org/kanter/2010/04/surprise-four-
strategies-for-c.html (accessed May 30, 2013); Kentucky Public Service Commission, Ike and Ice: 
Report on the September 2008 Wind Storm and the January 2009 Ice Storm, 166; Adrian Kun, 
“Twitter Became Primary Boulder Fire Information Source,” University of Colorado, 
CUindependent.Com, September 8, 2010, http://www.cuindependent.com/2010/09/08/twitter-
became-primary-boulder-fire-information-source/17444/. 
14 Michael Bruch et al., Power Blackout Risks: Risk Management Options (The Netherlands: 




                                            
Many papers have been written about the infrastructure of power outages 
(i.e., how the power grid works, vulnerabilities, and ways to strengthen the 
system). For example, in 2012, a U.S. Senate committee held hearings on 
“Weather-Related Electrical Outages” and what actions should be taken to help 
or moderate such outages. The witness panels were comprised of 
representatives from U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, and Norwich Public 
Utilities. The focus of the hearing was on the power grid.16 
In 2013, New York City produced a 445-page comprehensive plan, “A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York,” to rebuild communities impacted by Super 
Storm Sandy, and to increase the city’s resilience. Much of the report was 
focused on infrastructure. Though the report acknowledged that communications 
were severely hampered by the severe power outage, the focus was how to 
harden the infrastructure; the report did not address how the city might 
communicate to the public during these dire circumstances.17 
High-tech solutions suggested: The communications field continues to 
evolve rapidly. Blogs and Twitter feeds are increasingly serving as primary 
sources of information. Rosabeth Moss Kantor of Harvard Business School 
recommended leveraging social networks to minimize disruptions, and to 
disseminate data in short cycles.18  
Social media have proven to be reliable communications methods during 
emergencies. The University of Colorado’s newspaper reported that Twitter was 
one of the better sources for up-to-date information on the 2010 Boulder fire.19 
Arlington County, Virginia County Manager Barbara Donnellan reported to the 
Arlington County Board that Twitter was one of the few channels that worked 
16 U.S. Senate Committee on Energy & Natural Resources, Full Committee Hearing: 
Weather-Related Electrical Outages (Video) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate [April 26, 2012]). 
17 Bloomberg, “A Stronger, More Resilient New York.” 
18 Kanter, “Surprise! Four Strategies for Coping with Disruptions.” 
19 Kun, “Twitter Became Primary Boulder Fire Information Source.” 
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flawlessly throughout the 2012 “super-derecho”20 storm event.21 During its 2012 
typhoon, the government of the Philippines used Twitter to engage with 
residents, not only to provide information, but also to request help with situational 
awareness.22 
In 2008-2009, the state of Kentucky received a one-two punch from “Ike” 
and “Ice,” two severe weather incidents: September 2008 windstorm (Ike) and 
January 2009 ice storm (Ice). A report on Ike and Ice from the Kentucky Public 
Service Commission described how lack of phone service hindered the ability to 
get information to news media.23 The report also noted that many residents do 
not understand that portable telephone handsets do not function when their 
batteries lose power.24  
The Kentucky report included a round-up of all regional power companies 
on their use (or non-use) of their own websites to provide updated information to 
customers.25 A standout in these events was Duke Kentucky, one of the affected 
utilities, and its public information efforts. The report complimented Duke 
Kentucky on its proactive use of Twitter to share frequent updates with the public. 
The report included a discussion of the utility’s use of a popular hashtag for that 
storm, “#snOMG.” It also mentioned that Madisonville (Kentucky) Mayor Bill Cox 
used Facebook to provide useful information to his constituents, including 
information on utility crew locations, boil water advisories, traffic conditions and 
 
 
20 “Derecho” is a series of severe, widespread, straight-line windstorms. 
21 Barbara Donnellan, Derecho: Recovering from Catastrophic Storms (Arlington, Virginia: 
Arlington County, Virginia [2012]), 
http://www.arlingtonva.us/departments/CountyManager/Documents/file86924.pdf. 
22 Darrell M. West and Elizabeth Valentini, How Mobile Devices are Transforming Disaster 
Relief and Public Safety (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution [2013]). 
23 Kentucky Public Service Commission, Ike and Ice: Report on the September 2008 Wind 
Storm and the January 2009 Ice Storm, 166. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
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emergency shelters. The report recommended that all utilities consider 
establishing their own social media accounts to share important information 
during crises.26  
In July 2012, the American Red Cross established a new Digital 
Operations center within its National Disaster Operations Center. It was the first 
of its kind to monitor social media to aid disaster relief efforts, acknowledging the 
increasingly important role that social media plays in Americans’ daily life.27  
The response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake saw several innovations, 
including crowdsourced maps that helped in rescue and humanitarian efforts.28 
Within two hours of Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, students at Tufts 
University in Boston set up an Ushahidi website. Witnesses sent information by 
text message; volunteers mapped GPS coordinates and provided critical 
information to rescue teams on the ground. Some of the messages were simple: 
“I’m buried under rubble, but I’m still alive.” In the 25 days following the 
earthquake, Ushahidi-Haiti mapped some 2,500 reports.29 The Tufts example 
showed the value of virtual volunteers, who brought their expertise and 
capabilities, unhindered by unstable infrastructure in the disaster community. 
A blogger for the Emergency Management website urged utilities and 
governments to use their websites for critical information during emergencies, 
and to make that information available for smartphones.30  
26  Ibid. 
27 U.S. House Homeland Security Committee, House Homeland Security Emergency 
Preparedness, Response, and Communications Subcommittee Visits Red Cross Digital Ops 
Center; Center is First to use Social Media Monitoring for Disaster Relief (Lanham, Maryland: 
Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc. [2012]), 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/102692566
3?accountid=12702. 
28 Knight Foundation, Lessons from Haiti: Media, Information System and Communities. 
29 Jessica Ramirez, “'Ushahidi' Technology Saves Lives in Haiti and Chile,” TIME Magazine, 
March 3, 2010. 
30 Gerald Baron, “Power Outage Communications—Lessons Apply to Emergency 




                                            
Many communities, including the researcher’s own community of 
Arlington, Virginia, have developed emergency alert systems, which send text 
messages to subscribers via email accounts or mobile devices. The local 
jurisdictions comprising the National Capital Region collaborate on the 
CAPITALERT campaign, to encourage all residents, workers, and visitors to 
subscribe to alert systems.31 
C. AREA 2: MISMATCHED INFORMATION 
The research showed that, during crises, people crave hyper-local 
information, at a time when broadcast media are focused on the larger crisis. In a 
number of cases, local community radio proved useful in this regard.  
The Knight Foundation reported that radio was the “most effective tool” in 
the aftermath of the devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake, providing valuable 
information to the community and serving as a “heroic lifeline.”32 In contrast, the 
report on the 2008 New Hampshire ice storm described that some people relied 
on car radios, but many local radio stations did not have local staff to receive and 
air information, and instead, aired nationally syndicated programming.33  
A bipartisan U.S. House of Representatives committee report on 
Hurricane Katrina included a 19-page section on communications infrastructure, 
which discussed satellite phones, radio communications, and other ways in 
which responders and operations centers can communicate with each other. The 
report contained only one mention of how residents could receive important 
information, when it described how evacuees in the Superdome listened to AM 
radio.34  
31 For example, people can sign up for Arlington Alert at www.arlingtonalert.com, and they 
can also sign up at the regional cooperative website www.capitalalert.gov.  
32 Knight Foundation, Lessons from Haiti: Media, Information System and Communities. 
33 State of New Hampshire, December 11–12, 2008, Ice Storm: State Response After-Action 
Report. 
34 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
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The 2009 Kentucky report described that utilities used their designated 
spokespeople to share information with local news media, and that local radio 
was particularly effective.35  
D. AREA 3: INFRASTRUCTURE COLLAPSE 
In looking at the direst circumstances, the research turned up evidence of 
success in conveying information to the public, by using old-school methods.  
In 1997, a massive flood virtually wiped out the town of Grand Forks, 
North Dakota. With most of its major infrastructure destroyed, and 90 percent of 
its population evacuated, Grand Forks realized that it was impossible for local 
government to over-communicate. Local government stood up a Public 
Information Center, which used old-fashioned newsletters to communicate with 
thousands of people living in FEMA trailers.36  
For its 2012 derecho storm response, emergency managers in Arlington, 
Virginia created flyers with critical information on heat safety and asked its 
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) to distribute them to the most 
vulnerable residents.37 Arlington coped with the loss of its 911 system by staffing 
every fire station 24/7 with CERT or public safety personnel, equipped them with 
public safety radios, and instructed the public to go to any fire station in an 
emergency, should they be unable to reach the 911 center.38  
Following Japan’s 2011 “triple disaster” of earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear crises, newspaper reporters created handwritten posters with important 
information for victims and posted them in gathering places (described in further 
35 Kentucky Public Service Commission, Ike and Ice: Report on the September 2008 Wind 
Storm and the January 2009 Ice Storm, 166. 
36 City of Grand Forks, Grand Forks Flood Disaster and Recovery Lessons Learned. 
37 Donnellan, “Derecho: Recovering from Catastrophic Storms.” 
38 Ibid. 
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detail in Chapter VI).39 In the aftermath of the 2008 New Hampshire ice storm, 
local general stores, and gas stations became information hubs.40  
In its robust Resilient Communications guide, the United Kingdom’s 
Cabinet Office suggested using modern technologies, including alerting systems 
and social media, but also cautioned that “more traditional” methods also be 
employed where needed, including sirens, door knocking and bullhorns.41 
E. SIGNIFICANT GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
A number of reports acknowledged the important role that 
communications play in a crisis, yet did not address how official sources could 
convey important information to the public during a major power outage. 
On August 14, 2003, a sagging transmission line in Ohio touched a tree 
branch, triggering a cascading power outage that left 50 million people in the 
dark in eight U.S. states and two Canadian provinces. In its report on the 
blackout, the Michigan Public Service Commission included a section on Public 
Information Needs. The report acknowledged, “One of the most important crisis 
management actions state government takes during an emergency is to provide 
information to the public.” Despite this statement, the report did not address 
public communications.42 
The Michigan report discussed “full and robust” communications between 
government agencies and focused on the Commission’s role in sharing 
information with the Governor. During the crisis, the Commission provided 
regular updates to the Governor’s office, as well as to the local, regional, and 
national press. The Commission also issued press releases asking Michigan 
39 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
40 State of New Hampshire, December 11–12, 2008 Ice Storm: State Response After-Action 
Report. 
41 Cabinet Office, Resilient Communications. 
42 Michigan Public Service Commission, Report on August 14th Blackout. 
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residents to conserve electricity to help reduce demand, but did not address how 
the public might receive this information.43 
Although Illinois was not affected by the 2003 blackout, the state 
commissioned a Special Task Force to prepare for the possibility of a major 
blackout. The Task Force’s “Blackout Solutions” report was quite thorough, yet 
failed to mention how governments could communicate with its residents during 
power outages. The focus was on how governments themselves should be 
prepared.44 (The 2003 blackout is discussed at length in Chapter IV.)  
Following a severe power outage in 2003, the New York City after-action 
report to Mayor Michael Bloomberg did not cover efforts to communicate directly 
with the public. Instead, the report focused on City Hall’s relationship with media 
outlets. It described how City Hall lost its ability to send live video directly to 
television stations, and cited this as a major failure.45  
A 2008 ice storm devastated New Hampshire, affecting 211 of 234 
communities in the state. At the worst point, more than half the state’s population 
was without electric power and the outage was sustained; power was not fully 
restored for 11 days. A group convened by New Hampshire Governor John 
Lynch found that sharing critical information with the public proved to be a 
“significant challenge” during this incident. The incident was long enough that 
people’s battery power was depleted.46  
With a number of rolling blackouts throughout California in 2001, City of 
San Jose produced a detailed Annex to its Emergency Operations Plan, 
specifically for power disruptions. The sections on Public Information and 
43  Ibid. 
44 Special Task Force on the Condition and Future of the Illinois Energy Infrastructure, 
Blackout Solutions (Springfield, Illinois: State of Illinois [2004]), 
http://www.standingupforillinois.org/pdf/BlackoutSolutions/report.pdf. 
45 New York City Emergency Response Task Force, Enhancing New York City’s Emergency 
Preparedness: A Report to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg (New York, New York: City of New York 
[2003]), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/em_task_force_final_10_28_03.pdf.  
46 State of New Hampshire, December 11–12, 2008 Ice Storm: State Response After-Action 
Report. 
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Advance Warning Information Coordination described how the Public Information 
Officer will release accurate information to the public, and that City staff will make 
sure that generators will be fully fueled and operational during power outages.47 
It contained detailed instructions for how staff should be prepared with backup 
batteries. It did not, however, address how the power-less public could receive 
this information.  
In October 2011, a severe snowstorm in Connecticut resulted in a two-
week power outage for nearly 810,000 customers. The state of Connecticut hired 
the crisis management consulting firm Witt Associates to analyze the disaster 
and produce a paper. The Witt report concluded that the power company, 
Connecticut Power & Light, made things worse for itself when it publicized an 
overly optimistic goal of restoring power to 99 percent of customers by Nov. 6 
and then failed to meet this goal. This greatly contributed to customer 
frustration.48  
The Witt report did not touch on how emergency managers communicated 
with residents during this time. It does briefly mention that the utility released 
information to the public through news media.49 The report discussed the power 
company’s role in public communications, rather than that of state or local 
emergency managers.  
In an Annex to its Emergency Operations Plan, City of Houston 




47 Office of Emergency Services, Operations Plan: Annex P, Power Outages (San Jose, 
California: City of San Jose. 
48 Witt Associates, Connecticut October 2011 Snowstorm Power Restoration Report 





                                            
information may be unavailable and alternative methods of getting information 
out to the public will be necessary.” The report did not go further to suggest what 
those alternative methods might be.50  
The Pan American Health Organization published a robust manual for 
disaster response teams that gives good advice on how to manage 
communications. The manual ignored how a severe power outage might affect 
the work, with the exception of a single mention that, if electricity and telephone 
are missing or spotty, the team should find “other systems that will allow 
information to be collected, produced and disseminated from the affected 
area.”51 This report did not suggest what those “other systems” might be. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funded a study for the 
National Capital Region on critical infrastructure, with an emphasis on resilience 
and interdependencies. One of the study’s major findings was the importance of 
utilities’ timely, thorough communications with their customers. Public 
communications was a small mention in the study, which concluded that when 
television and the Internet are not available, “something else must be used to fill 
the gaps,” without hinting at what that “something else” might be.52 It was 
particularly disappointing that a DHS-funded study on resilience did not attempt 
to address this problematic communications gap.  
Why does this gap exist? How is it that so many responsible entities 
have produced reports that acknowledged the problem of communicating 
important information to the public during major blackouts, but ignored the need 
50 City of Houston, Emergency Management Plan, Annex L, Utilities (Houston, Texas: City of 
Houston Office of Emergency Management [2008]). 
51 Ricardo Perez, Martha Rodriguez and Susana Arroyo Barrentes, Information Management 
and Communication in Emergencies and Disasters: Manual for Disaster Response Teams 
(Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health Organization [2009]). 
52 University Consortium for Infrastructure Protection, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the 
National Capital Region; Risk-Based Foundations for Resilience and Sustainability; Final Report, 
Volume 20: Hurricane Isabel: Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Assessment (Fairfax, 
Virginia: George Mason University [September 2005]). 
 21 
                                            
for solutions? The answer is not clear; this this is an area that is under-
researched and would benefit from further exploration and rigorous inquiry.  
It is possible that emergency managers think of blackout communications 
as being someone else’s problem; in other words, it is the power company’s 
problem and in the meantime, emergency managers are doing the best they can. 
Conversely, the power company may think of public communications as being 
the localities’ problem, and that the company is doing its best to restore 
electricity. 
It is also possible that emergency managers find the prospect of 
addressing this gap to be too daunting, too big a problem to address within 
existing budgets. If emergency managers were to assume that solutions lie 
primarily in technological or infrastructure answers, those would, indeed, be 
expensive solutions.  
Whatever the reasons, the gap exists. 
By examining emergency communications efforts in three crises, and 
using the “high-low-no-tech” conceptual framework, this research project 
addressed this gap and, it is hoped, can help inform emergency managers going 
forward (see Appendix C for a comparison). 
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III. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before, during and after emergencies, people want timely, accurate 
information from a trusted source; key trusted sources include local governments 
and public safety officials. This research project addressed this important 
communications goal—helping emergency managers share critical life/safety 
information with the public during a major power outage.  
The research project was designed to answer the overall research 
question: 
What high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech communication strategies can 
support public communications during large-scale power outages?  
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The structured focused comparison method was used to examine three 
crises that involved major power outages. This is a straightforward method of 
evaluating multiple cases. The method is “structured” by asking the same 
questions of each case, thus enabling comparisons and findings across the 
cases. The method is also “focused” by only looking at certain aspects of the 
cases.53 The structured focused comparison method was ideal for this project, as 
it enabled a systematic comparison of historic events, focused squarely on 
issues of public communications, vs. for example, communications between first 
responders. 
The project applied the “high-low-no-tech” conceptual framework to 
examine the three core communications issues identified in Chapter I. The three 
core issues are: fragile communications channels, Mismatched information, and 
collapse of communications infrastructure. For each core issue, the project 
53 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 331. 
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examined the actions different communities took when faced with the loss of 
primary communications methods in three crises: 
• Multi-state blackout, northeast U.S., 2003  
• Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, 2005 
• Triple disaster, Japan, 2011 
These were chosen to represent a diverse set of cases; they were diverse 
in terms of causation, geography, and scope. The factors considered:  
• More recent: Cases selected from the recent past, as the “wired” 
nature of our modern society is a baseline aspect of our modern 
world.  
• Geographic: Selected one case from another country. 
• Scope: Events chosen were of different scope, though all were 
major crises that involved multiple jurisdictions. 
• Well-documented: Chose cases about which much has been 
written.  
All three cases had a number of similarities: all had significant 
communications breakdowns and difficulties getting critical information to people 
who needed it. All three incidents were catastrophic in nature, causing a total 
disruption of the community.  
C. DATA COLLECTION 
The project cast a wide net and examined a wide variety of sources 
including books, government research reports, after-action reports, journal 
articles, press articles, online articles, online videos, online blogs and websites. 
Wherever possible, the focus was on first-hand accounts, well-sourced reports, 
and peer-reviewed academic writings.  
Most sources were written retrospectively, after the crisis was over; the 
writers had the advantage of hindsight and more accurate data. During crises, 
many of the immediate articles tended to have incomplete information and 
therefore were less useful to this project. Press reports were from media outlets 
from the affected area, as well as outside the affected area.  
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To address the overall research question, the following sub-questions 
were useful in reviewing the cases: 
Basic information 
1. What happened?  
• What is the basic description of the incident? 
Communications 
2. How were communications impacted? 
• Were any channels open / available? 
3. How did the public receive important information during the crisis? 
4. What went well? 
• What factors were present that affected the outcome in a positive 
way? 
5. What went poorly? 
• What factors were present that affected the outcome in a negative 
way? 
6. What are the lessons learned? 
• Any good ideas / solutions that emerged? 
• Did people make use of “old-school” methods and, if so, how were 
they used? 
• Did people make use of new technologies and, if so, how were they 
used? 
Additional 
7. What is the relationship between people’s level of technical dependence 
and their resilience during severe power outages?  
A description of how these questions helped to address the overall 
research question is in Appendix B.  
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
The researcher collected, reviewed and analyzed literature for each of the 
three cases. For each, the project sought to address the research question, by 
asking the above-mentioned sub-questions, specifically looking for information 
that addressed the three core communications issues (fragile communications 
channels; Mismatched information; and collapse of communications 
infrastructure).  
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The results of this analysis are presented in each case study’s chapter. 
High-level information on how the “high-low-no-tech” addressed the three 
communications issues is summarized in a table in Appendix C. 
E. DEFINITIONS 
Terms as used in this paper are defined in Appendix A.  
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IV. CASE STUDY—2003 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT 
A. THE EVENT 
On August 14, 2003, a perfect storm of high temperatures, high demand, 
obsolete equipment, human errors and miscommunication triggered the worst 
power blackout in U.S. history. The cascading power outage left 56 million 
people in the dark in eight U.S. states and two Canadian provinces.54 (Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1.  Blackout of August 14, 2003 (from NASA  and Columbia 
University’s Earth Institute, 2003) 
The blackout shut down 100 power plants, closed 12 airports, and is 
estimated to have cost up to $6 billion.55 The power outage gridlocked New York 
City, Albany, Syracuse, Buffalo, Rochester, Erie, Cleveland, Detroit, Toronto, 
Ottawa and hundreds of cities and towns across Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, 
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Vermont, Ontario and 
Quebec.56 
54 Stephen Graham, Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails (New York: Routledge, 
2010). 
55 Special Task Force on the Condition and Future of the Illinois Energy Infrastructure, 
Blackout Solutions. 
56 Graham, Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails. 
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In New York City, 12,000 traffic signals lost power simultaneously, 
instantly gridlocking traffic. More than 400,000 people were stranded when 413 
trains lost power.57 Manhattan hotel guests slept on the street when their 
electronic key cards stopped working.58 Power was not restored to parts of the 
affected areas for four days. Sections of Ontario suffered rolling blackouts for 
more than a week.59  
Medical researchers reported that the blackout resulted in increased 
health risks, including respiratory disease and death, particularly among the 
elderly and those with compromised health conditions.60 In some areas, power 
outages shut down water pumps in the city’s drinking water systems; the low 
pressure prompted health officials to issue boil-water advisories, including the 
Cleveland, Ohio area.61 
Interestingly, even though the “normal accident” cascading scenario has 
been thoroughly studied and validated, al-Qaeda initially took credit for the power 
outage, “to hit the pillars of the U.S. economy.” Despite these claims, there is no 
evidence of any such terrorist activity related to the 2003 blackout.62 
Communications problems abound: While the global Internet remained 
stable throughout the blackout, thousands of corporate and institutional networks 
 
57 NYC Office of Emergency Management, NYC Heat and Power Emergency Preparedness 
(Brooklyn, NY: City of New York Office of Emergency Management [2003]), 
www.gnyha.org/319/File.aspx. 
58 CBS, “CBS Evening News, 2003 Northeast Blackout,” YouTube video, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uza1fQZy4c. 
59 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 
Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations (Ottawa, Canada: 
Natural Resources Canada [2004]), http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/blackout-2003-final-report-
august-14-2003-blackout-united-states-and-canada-causes-and. 
60 Shao Lin et al., “Health Impact in New York City during the Northeastern Blackout of 
2003,” Public Health Reports 126, no. 3 (May–Jun, 2011): 384–393. 
61 David Snyder and Eric M. Weiss, “Rolling Power Outages Shut Off Water Supply,” The 
Washington Post, August 16, 2003. 
62 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 
Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations. 
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and millions of individuals were offline for hours or days. Affected organizations 
included federal, state and local governments; banks; businesses; hospitals; and 
Internet service providers.63 
 
Figure 2.  With telephone service largely unavailable, New Yorkers lined up in 
long queues to use public telephones64 (from Associated Press 2003) 
Telephone service was hit hard in the affected area. Mobile networks 
failed, due in part to heavy traffic, but also due to lack of electricity and failure of 
backup power supplies. Landline telephone service was also affected when call 
volume surged to 300 percent above normal levels in the New York City area. 
Even when landline service was available to individual homes, fancy 
equipment—particularly cordless phones—could not work without electric 
power.65 
Following the blackout, a number of official reports acknowledged 
communications problems, but few included solutions to these problems. 
63 J. Cowie et al., “Impact of the 2003 Blackouts on Internet Communications,” Preliminary 
Report, Renesys Corporation (updated March 1, 2004, 2003), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.183.998&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
64 BBC News, “Blackouts Cause N. America Chaos,” BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3152451.stm (accessed June 10, 2013). 
65 Matt Richtel and Simon Romero, “The Blackout of 2003: Communications—when 
Wireless Phones Failed because of Heavy use, Callers Turned to Land Lines,” The New York 




                                            
New York City’s after-action report to Mayor Bloomberg did not cover 
efforts to communicate directly with the public. Instead, the report focused on 
City Hall’s relationship with media outlets. It described how City Hall lost its ability 
to send live video directly to television stations, and cited this as a major failure. 
The report also recommended centralizing all information to flow through City 
Hall’s press office, which should then disseminate the information to every outlet 
available.66  
Another recommendation is that New York City government should 
strengthen its communications and relationships with businesses. And the 
reports recommended establishing a microwave or satellite link from City Hall to 
the City’s television broadcast tower, to be able to broadcast directly to television 
stations, without depending on fiber lines or backup power.67  
Although Illinois was not affected, the state commissioned a Special Task 
Force to prepare that state for the possibility of a blackout. The Task Force’s 
“Blackout Solutions” report was quite thorough, yet failed to mention how 
governments would communicate with its residents during power outages. The 
focus was on how the governments themselves should be prepared.68  
Although the blackout caused many problems, emergency 
communications with the public did not appear to be a serious problem, possibly 
due to the relatively short duration of the blackout, which was approximately four 
days in most areas.69 
 
66 New York City Emergency Response Task Force, Enhancing New York City’s Emergency 
Preparedness: A Report to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, 14. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Special Task Force on the Condition and Future of the Illinois Energy Infrastructure, 
“Blackout Solutions,” June 2004, 
http://www.standingupforillinois.org/pdf/BlackoutSolutions/report.pdf. 
69 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 
Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations. 
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B. ADDRESSING THE THREE CORE COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 
Successes are documented in the three core issue areas. 
Area Number 1: Fragile communication channels. Though most 
electricity-powered communications methods were knocked out by the power 
outage, text messaging did work.70 
While many people jockeyed to use working landline pay phones, New 
York-based Omnipod reported that its instant messaging (IM) services worked 
uninterrupted throughout the power outage. Customers with IM accounts were 
able to communicate with each other throughout the incident.71 Omnipod, which 
operated primarily in the New York area, reported a 30–35 percent increase in its 
instant-messaging traffic as soon as the blackout hit.72 
Social media were not available on the communications menu at the time 
of the 2003 blackout. Facebook launched in February 200473 and Twitter 
launched March 2006.74 
Area Number 2: Mismatched information. Some residents did better 
than others, particularly those who had enough foresight to have on hand 
battery-powered radios and flashlights, and matches to light a gas stove or 
candles. Old-fashioned hard-wired telephones worked throughout the blackout, 
but most people had upgraded to fancier cordless models with built-in voice-mail, 
70  Text messaging sends data in little packets, which do not need continuous network 
access; in addition, the messages travel through paths that are reserved for data only, are less 
congested, and more likely to be delivered successfully. Source: Cory Young, “S.O.S. Via SMS: 
Text Messaging as a Communication Strategy in Hurricane Crises,” Journal of Communication 
Studies 1, no. 3–4 (Summer/Fall, 2008), 197–216, 
http://faculty.ithaca.edu/youngc/docs/Publications/SOS_via_SMS.pdf. 
71 Ilena Armstrong, “Unprepared Companies were Left in the Dark,” SC Magazine 14, no. 9 
(2003), 18-18. 
72 Carmen Nobel and Caron Carlson, “Blackout Makes Communicating Difficult,” eWeek 20, 
no. 34 (08/25, 2003), 13. 
73 Sid Yadav, “Facebook—the Complete Biography,” Mashable, 
http://mashable.com/2006/08/25/facebook-profile/ (accessed June 23, 2013). 
74 Biz Stone, “Happy Birthday Twitter!” Twitter, https://blog.twitter.com/2011/happy-birthday-
twitter (accessed June 23, 2013). 
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and these did not work. RadioShack’s Manhattan store on 21st Street and Park 
Avenue did a brisk business selling battery-powered radios, flashlights and old-
fashioned telephones—to customers who brought cash, as electronic cash 
registers did not work.75 
For most residents throughout Ontario, their only source of news for the 
first two days of the blackout was through battery-powered radios. Local radio 
broadcaster CHUM Radio Ottawa consolidated all of its programming and 
delivered the same broadcast over its four stations (three FM stations and one 
AM station), providing around-the-clock coverage.76  
Ontario’s Marketing Magazine reported that the 2003 blackout sparked 
resurgence in radio as a medium, with strangers huddled around car radios. 
People with battery-powered radios seemed as “god-like as cavemen with a Bic 
lighter.” BBC Canada reported that daily listening time doubled.77 
In a book about the history of blackouts in America, author David Nye 
described how people immediately suspected terrorism as the cause of the 
August 14 blackout, coming as it did just two years after the Sept. 11, 2001 
attacks on New York and the Pentagon. But, he wrote, “Fortunately, radio news 
stations had standby power and informed listeners that the blackout was only 
what it appeared to be,” thus averting panic.78  
A bright spot during the blackout was the region’s network of amateur 
radio operators, known colloquially as “Ham” radio—a technology from the World 
75 Susan Warren and Melanie Trottman, “When Plug is Pulled on the Digital Age, the Basics 
Black Out; Like Auto-Flush Toilets, ATMs and, for One Pizza Man, A Power Cheese-Shredder,” 
Wall Street Journal, sec. A, August 18, 2003, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/398808402. 
76 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Ontario-U.S. Power Outage: 
Impacts on Critical Infrastructure; Incident Analysis no. IA06-002 (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian 
Government [2006]), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=698352. 
77 Andrea Zoe Aster, “Radio's New Wavelength,” Marketing Magazine 109, no. 4 (02/02, 
2004), 7–8. 
78 David E. Nye, When the Lights Went Out: A History of Blackouts in America (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2010), 292. 
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War I era.79 Ham operators are trained and pass stringent testing to earn their 
permits. Most communities in the U.S. have active ham radio groups who 
regularly practice their skills, frequently exercising with local public safety and 
emergency managers.80  
 
Figure 3.  Long Island’s Tom Carrubba coordinated Hams in New York City’s 
five boroughs and two counties (from Louis Lanzano, Associated Press 
2013) 
A sampling of the ways in which Ham radio operators helped to fill the 
information void:81 
• A quickly formed informal network on Long Island, NY passed 
hundreds of messages, including information on bridge/tunnel 
closures, traffic conditions, which stores or gas stations were open.  
• In the metropolitan New York City area, when a hospital lost all 
power, Ham radio operators provided all its communications with 
ambulances.  
• In New York City, Ham teams provided communications for Red 
Cross Emergency Responsible Vehicles, including accompanying 
them on fire calls.  
79 Stephen Singer, “Ham Radios Came to Rescue in Blackout,” Associated Press, August 
26, 2003, http://www.eham.net/articles/6333. 
80 Andrew Boggs, “The Role of Amateur Radio in Disaster Communications,” Ice-Pack: 
Emergency Preparedness Systems, http://www.ice-pack.com/EP_news/2010/11/the-role-of-
amateur-radio-in-disaster-communications/. 
81 American Radio Relay League, “Hams a Bright Spot during Power Blackout,” QST 87, no. 
10 (October, 2003), 79–80. http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http:// 
search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/228570780?accountid=12702. 
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• In New Jersey, Ham operators connected Red Cross chapters to 
each other.  
• In upstate New York, Ham teams provided communication for local 
emergency managers when they lost all regular communications 
modes. 
• In Michigan, Ham teams also supported local emergency 
operations and the local Red Cross operations. 
• In Ohio, all northern Ohio amateur radio organizations were 
activated. Teams in Cleveland, Akron, and other cities handled 
communications for Ohio Emergency Management.  
• In Connecticut, Ham operators relayed information between Red 
Cross operations in Farmington, CT and New York City.  
• Ham operators in Bethel, CT supported local emergency response.  
Chris Poirier of GovLoop, an online community for public sector 
professionals, commented on how useful Hams can be in crises: “Most times 
when the power grid goes down Hams are the only one's on [sic] the area and 
passing information. Hams can even push data and video with minimal to no grid 
power during an emergency. In other words, when the lights go out, they are still 
on, thus making them great partners in the effort.”82 
Poirier also made the case that, if emergency managers need volunteer 
help to implement social media communications platforms, Hams are well suited 
to the task. Hams love new technology, understand incident command, and 
engage in regular training.83  Ham operators cannot broadcast to a mass (public) 
audience, but have proven invaluable to the responder community.  
Print media continued to operate, using generator power, or were able to 
switch operations to other offices in unaffected areas. 84   
82 Chris Poirier, “The Emergency Communications Catalyst: Social Media Meets Amateur 
Radio,” Gov Loop, http://www.govloop.com/profiles/blogs/the-emergency-communications-
catalyst-social-media-meets-amateur. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Ontario-U.S. Power Outage: 
Impacts on Critical Infrastructure; Incident Analysis no. IA06-002.  
 34 
                                            
Area Number 3: Collapse of communications infrastructure. CBS 
anchor Dan Rather described the massive blackout as a time of getting “back to 
basics,” as people relied on the sun for light and feet for transportation.85 
Crain Communications, which publishes Advertising Age and Crain’s New 
York Business, among others, managed to continue coverage through the 
blackout by writing stories in longhand and dictating them to colleagues in the 
company’s Los Angeles office. Publisher and editorial director David Klein 
remarked, “…the older your technology, the better off you are.”86  
C. COMMUNICATIONS FAILURES 
The consensus seemed to be that state and local governments had done 
a good job of preparing for a massive emergency, and that the emergency 
response had generally gone very well. However, it seems that residents—New 
Yorkers at least—were not properly prepared themselves to weather a major 
emergency. Department of Homeland Security officials “gingerly” reminded news 
media of its “widely ridiculed” advice for residents to stock up on emergency 
supplies. Such supplies included batteries and radios.87  
In Ontario, television coverage continued, but due to the blackout, many 
viewers in the affected areas could not view the broadcasts. TV coverage thus 
was more useful to keep the rest of the nation informed of the disaster.88  
Telecommunications failures: Communications problems also affected 
response workers. New York City’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
reported that its employee call center struggled with having enough battery back-
up to power call center telephones. Initially, 800-megahertz radios helped with 
85 CBS, CBS Evening News, 2003 Northeast Blackout. 
86 Rance Crain, “Crain in Blackout Bull's-Eye, but we Still Got the News Out,” Advertising 
Age, sec. 74, August 25, 2003. 
87 Michael Hirsh and Daniel Klaidman, “What Went Wrong,” Newsweek, August 25, 2003, 
32. 
88 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Ontario-U.S. Power Outage: 
Impacts on Critical Infrastructure; Incident Analysis no. IA06-002. 
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internal communications, but their use was limited to the life of the battery. 
Without use of computers, the department also struggled with preparing press 
releases and health advisories; the report recommended being prepared with 
hard-copy releases ahead of time.89  
Ontario’s telephone networks generally reported few difficulties, but did 
need generator fuel to maintain the system, including the 911 system; this was 
an area of real concern throughout the incident. Customers also experienced 
problems with pagers, which failed at times, including at St. John’s Ambulance 
service. Canadian cellular phones were problematic, with networks being 
overloaded during the blackout with high volume usage. Because of the many 
problems during the 2003 blackout, in 2004, the Government of Canada 
introduced Wireless Priority Service (WPS) for public safety, first responders, and 
emergency managers, giving them priority access to cellular network for 
emergencies.90  
Mobile phone service was also hit hard in the U.S. After the Sept. 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, the cellular industry had promised to upgrade networks in 
order to improve its performance during emergencies, and came under fire for 
the massive service failures in the 2003 blackout. Cellular sites had backup 
battery power, but it only lasted a few hours before needing recharging. Though 
landlines generally stayed in service throughout the blackout, many customers 
had switched from landlines to wireless service.91 
While on a business trip to Cleveland, a vice president of a two-way radio 
company experienced the 2003 blackout first-hand when his hotel had no back-
up power. His conclusion: “A two-way communications system independent of 
89 Mark E. Beatty et al., “Blackout of 2003: Public Health Effects and Emergency Response,” 
Public Health Reports Vol. 121, no. 1 (January-February 2006): 36-44, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20056912. 
90 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Ontario-U.S. Power Outage: 
Impacts on Critical Infrastructure; Incident Analysis no. IA06-002. 
91 Andrew Ross Sorkin and Matt Richtel, “Cellphone Failures Cause Many to Question 
Systems,” New York Times 152, no. 52577 (August 16, 2003), B7. 
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the power grid should be an important part of any private, public or government 
emergency plan.”92 Granted, he is biased toward his own company’s and 
industry’s products, but it was worth noting his recommendation that every 
business and organization be prepared to communicate when the power goes 
out. 
New York City’s 911 system failed in several ways. The high call volume 
overloaded the system, and backup generators at several Verizon offices failed, 
knocking out 911 service for some minutes.93 
Vulnerable power grid: Many experts have pointed out that the scope, 
age and complexity of our nation’s power grid makes it sensitive to accidents. 
Our nation is almost certainly going to experience power outages for the 
foreseeable future; some of the outages will be catastrophic. One expert has 
commented that, when something does go wrong, “…the dominoes can start to 
fall over a wider and wider area.”94 
And, ominously, experts have concluded that disrupting the grid through a 
deliberate act of terrorism would be “ridiculously easy.”95 
D. SUMMARY 
An analysis of the 2003 Blackout in the context of the “high-tech, low-tech, 
and no-tech” conceptual framework revealed that for each of the three core 
communications issues, people did manage to communicate successfully.  
In the first area of fragile communications channels, the high-tech tool of 
instant messaging helped people stay in touch with each other, despite loss of 
telephone and mobile service. In the second area of Mismatched information, 
92 Chris Lougee, “An Ounce of Prevention,” Mobile Radio Technology 25, no. 2 (February 
2007): 22–22. 
93 Michael Cooper, “After Blackout, a Call for a 911 Overhaul,” New York Times, sec. 153 
October 29, 2003. 




                                            
low-tech methods filled an important gap; local radio reached the community, and 
Ham radio operators served as invaluable partners for first responders. In the 
third area of communications infrastructure collapse, people went “back to 
basics” to get the job done.  
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V. CASE STUDY—HURRICANE KATRINA 
A. THE EVENT 
The day before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, 
the National Weather Service in Slidell, Louisiana issued an alert that included 
this ominous warning:  
Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks … Perhaps longer 
… Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by 
modern standards.96  
Sadly, this prediction turned out to be completely accurate.  
 
Figure 4.  Image of Hurricane Katrina (from NOAA 2005) 
Hurricane Katrina was one of the most devastating disasters in U.S. 
history. It was the third-deadliest hurricane since 1900, with more than 1,800 
fatalities.97 Thousands of homes and businesses were obliterated. Entire 
neighborhoods were destroyed. The hurricane spawned 43 tornadoes and storm 
 
96 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
97 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: 
Hurricane Katrina, 23–30 August 2005 (Miami, Florida: National Weather Service/National 
Hurricane Center [2005]), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. 
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surge caused flooding throughout the entire Gulf Coast. The disruption is hard to 
comprehend; 1.1 million people were evacuated and 770,000 people were 
displaced from their homes.98 
The damage and devastation to the city of New Orleans is well known, but 
Katrina also caused tremendous damage to other parts of Louisiana, as well as 
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida.99 
In Mississippi, Katrina brought a blender-like storm surge, which extended 
up to 10 miles inland, and as high as 34 feet. More than half the state, which 
suffered catastrophic wind and water damage, was without power. The storm 
killed at least 230 people and displaced nearly 200,000 Mississippians from their 
homes. The storm wreaked havoc in other ways; for example, it killed more than 
three million chickens. A month after Katrina hit, 19,000 households remained 
without electric power.100 
Alabama did not suffer a direct hit, but still experienced a wave surge of 
13.5 feet, which caused significant damage along the coast. Two people died, 
more than 1,000 homes were destroyed, and a drilling platform was dislodged 
and caught under a highway bridge.101 Under normal circumstances, this 
damage alone would have been national news.  
New Orleans’ losses were overwhelming. The city’s levee system failed; at 
peak, 80 percent of the city was flooded, in some places 20 feet deep.102 (Figure 
5) 
98 Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (Washington, D.C.: White House [2006]). 
99 Knabb, Rhome, and Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 
2005. 
100 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
101  Ibid. 
102  Ibid. 
 40 
                                            
 Figure 5.  Extent of flooding in New Orleans (from Times-Picayune 2005) 
Louisiana had 1,100 storm-related deaths, mostly due to storm surge 
flooding. In addition, contaminated floodwaters posed another threat; E.coli 
bacterial infections killed five people.103  
Across the region, the hurricane affected a huge number of people; more 
than 1.2 million people were under evacuation orders. The devastation was 
difficult to quantify, but in terms of insured losses alone, Katrina caused $41.1 
billion in damages.104  
Infrastructure damaged: Across the region, infrastructure was hit hard. 
In the city of New Orleans alone, the hurricane left more than 3 million without 
power, some for several weeks.105 Customer power lines were knocked down 
103 Ibid. 




                                            
across the region; in Mississippi alone, more than 50,000 customer utility pole 
were destroyed.106 A full month after Katrina hit, more than 260,000 customer 
lines remained out of service, 238,000 in Louisiana and 22,000 in Mississippi.107 
In his book Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails, author Stephen Graham 
wrote about Hurricane Katrina and the “major breakdowns in social order” that 
resulted in New Orleans, due to the loss of infrastructure in that city.108 
Communications problems abound: Communications across the Gulf 
Coast region failed as the waters rose. The White House report on Hurricane 
Katrina described the loss of core communications infrastructure across the 
region as “unprecedented.”109 According to some observers, communications 
became the “biggest problem of the catastrophe.”110  
Telephone service—both landline and cellular—was virtually nonexistent 
for days because of flooding, power outages, and equipment theft.111 Nearly 
three million customers lost telephone service.112 Wireless service was also hard 
hit; at peak, 2,000 cell sites were out of service. A month later, 820 cell sites 
were still out of service, most within New Orleans and parts of Louisiana.113 
Satellite phones failed when water shorted out ground-based transponders.  
106 Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned. 
107 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
108 Graham, Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails. 
109 Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned. 
110 Christopher Cooper and Robert Block, Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of 
Homeland Security, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 2006), 333. 
111 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
112 Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned. 
113  Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
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Emergency services were severely hampered by damage to the region’s 
911 systems. In 13 counties in the region, 911 services were down in 38 call 
centers. A month after the hurricane, two 911 centers in Louisiana remained out 
of service.114  
Two additional examples of the total breakdown of communications: 
National Guard and first responders were forced to rely on face-to-face 
communications or on people running paper messages back and forth; both 
tactics were popularly used during the Revolutionary War.115 Another example: 
Louisiana State Senator Robert Barham, chairman of the State Senate's 
homeland security committee, summed up the situation in Louisiana: “People 
could not communicate. It got to the point that people were literally writing 
messages on paper, putting them in bottles and dropping them from helicopters 
to other people on the ground.”116 
B. ADDRESSING THE THREE CORE COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 
Many people have written about the many communications breakdowns 
after Hurricane Katrina struck. However, there were a few bright spots. As was 
the case in the 2003 Blackout, research discovered successes in each of the 
three core communications issue areas. 
Area Number 1: Fragile communication channels. With infrastructure 






114  Ibid. 
115  Ibid. 
116  Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned. 
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Mississippi, some responders in Mississippi were able to communicate on a 
limited level using satellite phones.117 In other instances, however, satellite 
phones were not usable, due to cloud cover.118 
Despite virtually non-existent telephone voice service, text messages from 
cellphones worked well. For example, officials at Tulane University in New 
Orleans realized that, though they had lost all voice communications, they could 
still communicate with each other via text messaging. This helped them to track 
down evacuees, to share information with each other, and to ask unaffected staff 
to update the Tulane website.119 
Text messaging also helped the relief effort. The Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) used text messaging to 
send messages requesting help around the country, and received 200 replies.120 
Mobile phones helped in other ways, too. They enabled many Gulf Coast 
residents to serve as citizen journalists, disseminating photos and video.121  
The Internet helped people find each other. ACORN set up a message 
board on its website that helped people to contact one another. At some 
evacuation centers, people searched websites to find missing family members. 
And New Orleans native and Yahoo! Chief Executive Officer David Filo 
developed a metasearch engine that concurrently searched all websites created 
to find missing persons.122 
 
117 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 
118 Young, S.O.S. via SMS: Text Messaging as a Communication Strategy in Hurricane 
Crises, 197–216. 
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120 Garnett and Kouzmin, Communicating Throughout Katrina: Competing and 




                                            
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, Google had recently released a new 
service called Google Maps. People used this tool to build flood and damage 
information maps, and take advantage of crowd-sourcing opportunities (see 
Figure 6).123  
 
 
Figure 6.  Many people shared information on crowdsourced mapping tools. 
This map shows information about locations affected by Katrina (from 
Google Maps 2005) 
Social media did not play a role in the Hurricane Katrina response. Twitter 
had not yet been invented (2006),124 and Facebook was just beginning to 
expand beyond its Ivy League roots, having launched February 2004.125 At the 
time of Katrina, blogs were the primary social media used to share information, 
such as rescue efforts, missing people, community information, and relief efforts. 
123 Arifumi Utani, Teruhiro Mizumoto, and Takashi Okumura, How Geeks Responded to a 
Catastrophic Disaster of a High-Tech Country: Rapid Development of Counter-Disaster Systems 
for the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011 (Tokyo, Japan: Association for Computing 
Machinery [2011]). 
124 Stone, Happy Birthday Twitter! 
125 Yadav, Facebook—the Complete Biography. 
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Some private efforts were significant. Vanguard Technologies, a small 
Louisiana business, provided Saint Bernard and Plaquemines parishes with 
Internet protocol (IP) network solutions and Point of Presence (POP) Internet 
connectivity, which remained fully operational during Katrina. Vanguard also 
deployed a fully operational wireless broadband IP network, covering more than 
100 square miles, within five days of Katrina's Gulf Coast landfall. Vanguard 
Technologies, Inc., “showed up the day after the storm and provided 
communications when we had none,” said St. Bernard’s Parish officials.126 
The Internet played a huge role in relief donations. In the aftermath of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 13 million Americans made online donations to relief 
efforts; another seven million people set up their own online hurricane relief 
efforts. Individuals donated a total of $4.25 billion in response to Katrina.127 
Area Number 2: Mismatched information. Broadcast media were hit 
extremely hard. In the region, 50 percent of area radio stations and 44 percent of 
area television stations were damaged and off the air.128 At the time of the 
Katrina disaster, New Orleans had 41 broadcast radio stations. Of these, 37 were 
knocked out, but four stations continued to operate; two AM and two FM.129  
The radio stations that did operate provided situational awareness to 
emergency managers and provided valuable information to the community.130 
For example, in eastern New Orleans, Pastor Vien Nguyen supported 350 
parishioners throughout the event in the Mary Queen of Vietnam church. The 
126 Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned. 
127 Charity Navigator, “Hurricane Katrina: Katrina's Impact,” Charity Navigator, 
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm/bay/katrina.facts.htm. 
128 Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned. 
129 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
130 Ibid. 
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church lost power, but Father Nguyen had stocked it with supplies and a battery-
powered radio, which provided the flock with news and updates.131  
Amateur radio—known colloquially as “Ham” radio—was one of the few 
technologies that worked throughout. The National Communications System 
(NCS) is an interagency group of 23 federal departments and agencies that date 
to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963. Following Katrina, NCS coordinated nearly 
1,000 volunteer Ham radio operators, who provided invaluable assistance for 
rescue and relief efforts for government agencies, Red Cross and Salvation 
Army.132 
Ham operators cannot broadcast to a mass (public) audience, but were 
invaluable in assisting government agencies, Red Cross, and Salvation Army, by 
sending and receiving messages. The Red Cross deployed Hams to 250 shelter 
and feeding stations in Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. Hams relayed Red 
Cross messages to and from the Hancock County (Mississippi) EOC (Emergency 
Operations Center), and helped the EOC with situational awareness. Ham 
operators helped evacuees at airports in Texas and Louisiana connect with their 
families. In Mississippi, FEMA stationed amateur radio operators in evacuation 
centers, hospitals, and emergency management posts to aid communication.133 
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) successfully used Public Service 
Announcements (PSA). The CDC had made extensive preparations and had pre-
written a number of important health messages for the public. However, the 
collapse of communications infrastructure severely hampered its ability to get this 
information to the people who needed it. Even a CDC truck loaded with 
thousands of printed flyers was turned back to Atlanta because roads were 
131 Cooper and Block, Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security, 
333. 
132 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
133 Garnett and Kouzmin, Communicating Throughout Katrina: Competing and 
Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Communication, 171–188. 
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impassable. One solution that worked was videotaping PSAs in Atlanta, and 
hand-delivering them to disaster areas. There, the PSAs were aired in hardware 
stores and evacuation centers—locations where people were gathered.134 
Area Number 3: Collapse of communications infrastructure. With not 
too many options available, people got inventive.  
National Guard commanders relied on old-fashioned runners to relay 
messages.135 As Major General Harold A. Cross of the Mississippi National 
Guard explained, “We’ve got runners running from commander to commander. In 
other words, we are going to the sound of gunfire, as we used to say in the 
Revolutionary War.”136 
In Mississippi, local officials sent staff in cars to run disaster updates 
between the state capital and the coast.137 And handmade signs helped get 
important information to residents (Figure 7). 
134 Marsha L. Vanderford et al., “Emergency Communication Challenges in Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,” Journal of 
Applied Communication Research 35, no. 1 (February 2007), 9–25, 
http://nps.illiad.oclc.org/illiad/illiad.dll?Action=10&Form=75&Value=96592. 
135 Marc Landy, “A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina/the Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,” Publius 38, no. 1 (Winter, 2008), 152–165. 
136 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
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Figure 7.  Handmade sign in Slidell, Louisiana lets people know the water is 
safe to drink (from Win Hinderson, FEMA 2005) 
FEMA assembled 1,400 firefighters from around the country to spread out 
across the Gulf Coast, to serve as temporary community relations officers and 
hand out flyers to displaced hurricane victims.138  
Though the CDC did use its low-tech solution of airing PSAs where people 
were gathered, ultimately what worked best were in-person visits. CDC deployed 
30 health communication and education specialists to local and state health 
departments in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas — the largest deployment of 
communications and education specialists in the history of the CDC.139 The CDC 
also partnered with the Salvation Army and local groups, who hand-delivered 
printed health information to residents.140  
 
138 Lisa Rosetta, “Frustrated: Fire Crews to Hand Out Fliers for FEMA,” Salt Lake Tribune, 
September 6, 2005. 
139 Vanderford et al., Emergency Communication Challenges in Response to Hurricane 
Katrina: Lessons from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 9–25. 
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C. COMMUNICATIONS FAILURES 
The communications challenges associated with Hurricane Katrina have 
been well documented. 
Basic communications infrastructure failed. Landline and cellular 
telephone service were virtually nonexistent for days because of flooding, power 
outages, and theft of equipment. The 911 system was down in 13 counties. 
Individuals had no real way to communicate, except face-to-face. Even first 
responders had trouble.141 Broadcast media were hit hard; 100 television and 
radio broadcast stations were damaged and off the air.142  
A comprehensive report from a U.S. House Select Bipartisan Committee 
concluded that public messages were uncoordinated and confusing, leaving 
important questions unanswered. Government officials at all levels did not have a 
unified strategy for communicating with the public.143 One of the report’s key 
findings was the “lack of effective public communications” and that this failing had 
led to civil unrest and delayed relief efforts.144 
The White House report also found that Federal, State and local officials 
did not coordinate communications efforts and gave contradictory messages to 
the public. It was several weeks before Joint Information Centers were 
adequately resourced and able to operate at full capacity.145  
141 Garnett and Kouzmin, Communicating Throughout Katrina: Competing and 
Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Communication, 171–188. 
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Problems in the Superdome: Officials wrestled with special problems in 
the two main shelters in New Orleans, the Superdome and the Convention 
Center. Communications systems failures in the shelters led to an information 
vacuum and a number of erroneous media reports about looting, gunfire, rape, 
and murders in the Superdome and the Convention Center. The unchecked 
media reports spread, leading to exacerbated problems in the centers 
themselves. These erroneous rumors also hindered rescue efforts, by scaring 
away truck drivers carrying vital supplies.146 As the U.S. House Committee 
found, “Lack of a government public communications strategy and media hype of 
violence exacerbated public concerns and further delayed relief.”147  
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Public Superintendent Eddie 
Compass made the problems even worse, by going on national television and 
confirming the rumors that in the Superdome, babies were being raped and 
people were being killed. These rumors ultimately were proven false.148 
Many evacuees in the Superdome listened to AM radios, which were 
reporting horrific crimes in the Superdome; this led to panic. Responders were 
not able to counter the false information. Unfortunately, the Superdome’s public 
address system did not run on generator power and mobile phones did not work. 
Law enforcement addressed the 20,000 evacuees using bullhorns and face-to-
face conversations.149  
146 Landy, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina/the Federal Response to 
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D. SUMMARY 
An analysis of Hurricane Katrina in the context of the “high-tech, low-tech, 
and no-tech” conceptual framework revealed that for each of the three core 
communications issues, people did manage to communicate successfully.  
In the first area of fragile communications channels, several high-tech 
tools helped people communicate, including text messaging, websites, and 
crowdsourcing. In the second area, Mismatched information, local radio filled an 
important gap. In addition, Ham radio operators were extremely valuable to the 
first responder community. In the third area of communications infrastructure 
collapse, responders used Revolutionary War tactics and handwritten signs.  
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VI. CASE STUDY—2011 JAPAN’S TRIPLE DISASTER 
A. THE EVENT 
The 9.0 magnitude Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) struck Japan on 
March 11, 2011, at 2:46 p.m. local time.150 It was the fourth most powerful 
earthquake to have occurred anywhere on Earth since 1900.151  
The crisis worsened dramatically when the earthquake was followed by an 
enormous tsunami, which reached up to 40.5 meters (133 feet) above sea 
level—well above estimated levels—and devastated the coastline. Compounding 
the crisis was the third disaster, when the tsunami damaged a nuclear power 
station, resulting in radioactive fallout.152  
The earthquake and the tsunami killed 15,365 people, with another 8,206 
missing and 5,364 injured. More than 111,000 buildings were destroyed or 
damaged.153 Almost a half-million people became homeless in an instant.154 At 
150 Rajib Shaw et al., Knowledge Note 3-2; Cluster 3: Emergency Response / Emergency 
Communication, World Bank, 2012). 
151 Peter Mantanle, “The Great East Japan Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown: 
Towards the (Re)Construction of a Safe, Sustainable, and Compassionate Society in Japan's 





152 Arifumi Utani, Teruhiro Mizumoto and Takashi Okumura, “How Geeks Responded to a 
Catastrophic Disaster of a High-Tech Country: Rapid Development of Counter-Disaster Systems 





153 Mantanle, The Great East Japan Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown: Towards 
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Regions, 823–847. 
154 Yuko Fujigaki and Togo Tsukahara, “STS Implications of Japan’s 3/11 Crisis,” East Asian 
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http://muse.jhu.edu/. 
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the worst point of the disaster, 2.58 million people were without electric power in 
the three Prefectures most affected—Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima.155  
 
Figure 8.  Composite image displaying extent of massive power outage 
(indicated by red) (from NASA Earth Observatory 2011) 
No power, no phones, no Internet. The earthquake and tsunami caused 
massive power outages. A composite satellite image (Figure 8) compared lights 
observed in 2010 to 2011. Yellow indicates lights that functioned in both 2010 
and in 2011, following the disaster. Red indicates power outages on March 12, 
2011, compared with 2010.156 
Japan is a highly developed nation, with sophisticated communications 
infrastructure. It is one of the top six nations in the world in Internet usage, along 
155 National Policy Unit, Road to Recovery: Great East Japan Earthquake (Tokyo, Japan: 
Government of Japan, 2012), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/documents/2012/icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/03/07/roadtorecover
y.pdf. 
156  Michon Scott, “Electricity Losses in Northeastern Japan,” NASA, 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=49773. 
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with France, Germany, Korea, United Kingdom and United States.157 Japan has 
the world’s eighth largest number of mobile phone users.158 
With its reliance on Internet usage and mobile devices, Japan was hit hard 
when the massive power outages struck. The crisis caused immense damage to 
and congestion in telephone infrastructure, including 1.9 million fixed-line 
services and 29,000 mobile phone base stations. Government radio 
communication infrastructure was also seriously damaged.159  Mobile devices 
worked well until the batteries ran down, unless the person had a way to 
recharge.  
Newspapers’ ability to produce and distribute printed papers was severely 
hindered by problems such as damaged printing presses, lack of electric power, 
lack of fuel, and lack of transportation.160  
The disaster also illuminated a generational problem. Younger people had 
better Internet connectivity and could use mobile devices to get critical 
information, while older people had less access to information. People over the 
age of 60 accounted for 65.8 percent of those who died.161 
A culture of preparedness: Many have observed that Japan is among 
the most prepared nations in the world. Japan has nurtured a culture of 
preparedness since its devastating earthquake and subsequent fire and typhoon 
of 1923, which killed more than 100,000 people. Since that time, Japan has 
157 Japan has 101 million Internet users, which represents 79.5% of its population. Source:  
Internet World Stats, “Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users,” Miniwatts 
Marketing Group, http://www.Internetworldstats.com/top20.htm. 
158  Central Intelligence Agency, “Top 10 Lists for Mobile Phone and Internet Usage,” U.S. 
Government, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2012-featured-story-
archive/mobile-phone-and-Internet-usage.html. 
159  Shaw et al., Knowledge Note 3-2; Cluster 3: Emergency Response / Emergency 
Communication. 
160  Lois Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East 





                                            
implemented a number of policies and practices for resilient buildings, regular 
practice drills, warning systems, coastal city planning, etc. Observers have 
concluded that the damage and loss from the GEJE would have been much 
worse without Japan’s noted readiness policies.162 
For example, Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) sent automatic 
earthquake alerts seconds before the earthquake hit. These alerts interrupted TV 
and radio programming and were sent to schools and disaster prevention 
organizations. Japan is a nation of television watchers (87.2%), which enabled 
JMA alerts to reach a lot of people. Thanks to improved building codes and a 
culture of preparedness, few died as a result of the earthquake; 90 percent died 
by drowning as a result of the tsunami. This compared with the 1995 earthquake 
in Kobe, Japan, in which 80 percent of deaths resulted from collapsed 
buildings.163 To receive the earthquake and tsunami warnings, the most useful 
methods were wireless public address systems, radio and television broadcasts, 
and word of mouth.164 
B. ADDRESSING THE THREE CORE COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES  
A number of communications methods were helpful in the three identified 
core communications areas.  
Area Number 1: Fragile communication channels. People used a 
variety of high-tech methods to cope with loss of electricity, telephone and mobile 
service; they began using social media almost immediately following the 
earthquake. With their extensive reach, ease of use and low entry barriers, social 
media proved enormously helpful. Those who had Internet access posted 
updates, photos and videos that helped provide valuable information.165  
162  Emily Rauhala, “How Japan Became a Leader in Disaster Preparation,” TIME Magazine, 
March 11, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058390,00.html. 





                                            
 
 
Figure 9.  Town of Minamisanriku in Miyagi Prefecture, three days after the 
tsunami hit (from Tsuyoshi Matsumoto, The Yomiuri Shimbun via 
Associated Press 2011) 
For example, in the first hour after the earthquake, a Twitter user in 
southern Japan created a Twitter hash tag (#j-j-helpme) for the earthquake 
disaster, which served as an initial center point for rescue requests. Later, the 
Japanese government created hash tags for specific information, such as 
evacuation centers, and opened its first disaster-related Twitter account.166 
People shared an enormous amount of information via Twitter; the volume 
of re-tweets167 jumped to 20 times higher than the normal rate. An analysis of 
Twitter usage following the GEJE revealed that people in the disaster-affected 
areas mostly communicated directly with each other (using direct messages), 
and that people living outside the affected areas tended to re-tweet.168  
166 Ibid. 
167 “Re-tweeting” means that a Twitter user has shared someone else’s tweet by posting on 
his/her own Twitter feed. 
168 Mai Miyabe, Asako Miura and Elji Aramaki, “Use Trend Analysis of Twitter After the 




                                            
An analysis of tweets following three major disasters, including GEJE, 
concluded that Twitter posts about a disaster began at different parts of the 
network, and very quickly consolidated into a huge connected network that 
comprised more than 90 percent of Twitter members tweeting. This research also 
concluded that those tweeting spanned the globe, giving evidence of global 
concern, which may have some positive prospects for future fundraising.169 
Google Person Finder launched within 90 minutes of the earthquake. It 
ultimately mobilized 5,000 volunteers to help create profiles.170 It was successful 
because it coordinated its work with authorities, who possessed refugee and 
casualty information; it ultimately registered 590,000 people, which equaled the 
total number of refugees. The centralization of information—and avoidance of 
duplicative, competing efforts—was key to its success.171 Also on the same day 
as the earthquake, Google launched its Crisis Response page, a central 
repository in Japanese, English, Chinese, and Korean.172 
Twitter also saved lives. Mrs. Naoko Utsumi, 59, escaped the tsunami and 
evacuated to a community center rooftop, along with 400 others. She had her 
mobile phone, but was unable to make any calls or send text messages; 
however, she was able to send an email to her husband. The husband forwarded 
the email to their son in London; he sent a direct message via Twitter to the 
Deputy Governor of Tokyo with a plea for help. Within two days, all 400 people 
were airlifted to safety.173  
169 Seema Nagar, Aaditeshwar Seth and Anupam Joshi, “Characterization of Social Media 
Response to Natural Disasters; from Proceedings of the 21st International Conference 
Companion on World Wide Web (WWW '12 Companion)” (Lyon, France, ACM, April 2012), 
doi:10.1145/2187980.2188177, http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2187980.2188177. 
170  Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East 
Japan Earthquake. 
171 Utani, Mizumoto and Okumura, How Geeks Responded to a Catastrophic Disaster of a 
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Earthquake of March 2011. 
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Many Japanese residents used Facebook to post “I’m OK” status updates, 
easing worries from friends and family. The U.S. State Department (via Twitter) 
recommended contacting loved ones via social media, since telephone lines 
were down; this method was very helpful in a number of circumstances.174 
Japanese television broadcasts were also streamed live via commercial 
streaming services, including Ustream, Niconico Live and Yahoo! It began with a 
14-year-old student who live-streamed the NHK TV broadcast on Ustream, using 
his iPhone. He did this within 17 minutes of the earthquake; a risky move, since 
such live streaming is illegal in that country. Fortunately, many TV broadcasters 
themselves followed suit; the live streaming made the live broadcast information 
available to a much wider audience.175  
YouTube was successfully used to request assistance. For example, the 
mayor of Minami-Soma City used YouTube to make a desperate plea for 
volunteers and relief supplies. It worked; the video resulted in truckloads of relief 
supplies and an apology from government officials.176 
Social media was extensively used for search and rescue, as well as for 
fundraising; it was particularly effective in reaching younger generations.177  
Crowd-sourcing: The Internet enabled a virtual army of volunteers, who 
helped devise applications and ad-hoc systems to assist with relief efforts. This 
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and development efforts. Because volunteers were, for the most part, off-site, 
they were unaffected by the devastation and thus able to provide these valuable 
services.178  
Volunteers created crowd-sourcing tools, including OpenStreetMap and 
sinsai.info, an Ushahidi-style crisis map. The volunteers mapped thousands of 
reports.179 
Another crowd-sourcing effort has proven to be very successful. Safecast 
is a volunteer-led project to collect and share radiation measurements; it was 
created within a week of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. More than 3.5 million 
data readings have already been mapped, making Safecast the largest radiation-
monitoring project in the world.180 
Social media was very helpful in sharing important information, but proved 
less useful for relief workers. For example, some Twitter posts were re-tweeted 
after the victims had already been rescued.181 Misinformation at times hindered 
rescue and recovery efforts by diverting precious resources where they were not 
needed. Additional problems included a lack of discipline in using disaster hash 
tags; some people tweeted irrelevant information with those hash tags, creating a 
large number of distracting, irrelevant postings.182 
Additional high-tech usage: Though normal telephone service—both 
landline and mobile—was severely disrupted, there were some ways in which 
telephones proved very useful. For example, people used voice messaging to 
178 Utani, Mizumoto and Okumura, How Geeks Responded to a Catastrophic Disaster of a 
High-Tech Country: Rapid Development of Counter-Disaster Systems for the Great East Japan 
Earthquake of March 2011. 
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Considerations, CRS Report R41987 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Congressional 
Research Service). 
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Japan's Tsunami Disaster,” International Journal of Web-Based Communities 7, no. 3 (2011), 
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confirm whether family members and relatives were safe. People who had smart 
phones were able to access the Internet and social media tools, as long as they 
had access to electricity to recharge their devices.  
Satellite phones played a crucial role in emergency communication during 
the response stage.183 Humanitarian efforts in the stricken region included 
donations of laptop computers with long-life batteries. Dell and other technology 
companies donated hundreds of computers to volunteer centers in the affected 
areas.184  
Area Number 2: Mismatched information. One of the biggest problems 
was the lack of hyper-local information—information necessary for people’s 
emergency needs, e.g., supplies of food, water, and gasoline.185 After the JMA 
earthquake alerts went out, all domestic television channels changed to 
emergency broadcasting almost immediately. For the first three days, Japan’s six 
major national TV broadcasters devoted 90-plus percent of their programming to 
coverage of the disaster.186 Although the broadcasters provided wall-to-wall 
coverage, it focused on the national nuclear crisis, especially as the extent of the 
disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi plant became known. This is where hyper-local 
communication methods—e.g., community radio stations, local newspapers and 
newsletters—proved most valuable for people’s daily needs. 
Radio proved to be extremely valuable for three major reasons. First, 
many victims were able to use car radios or radios powered by batteries or hand 
cranking. Second, radio was particularly useful to older persons, who had less 
183 Shaw et al., Knowledge Note 3-2; Cluster 3: Emergency Response / Emergency 
Communication. 
184 Dell Inc., “Japan Earthquake and Tsunami; Providing Dell Technology and Employee 
Ground Support,” Dell, Inc., http://www.dell.com/Learn/us/en/uscorp1/corp-comm/japan-
earthquake?c=us&l=en&s=corp&delphi:gr=true. 
185 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
186  Ibid. 
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access and inclination to use Internet services.187 In the Tohoku area alone, 25 
emergency broadcast stations were set up to disseminate important information 
about distribution of emergency food, water, and supplies.188 The third area of 
value was that radio was able to provide highly localized information, for 
example, availability of help for people’s everyday needs, as well as information 
about aftershocks.189  
 
Figure 10.  Radio filled an important gap following the GEJE (Data from 
Appleby, 2013) 
It is telling to look at how the Japanese living in the disaster-affected areas 
used different communications methods before and after GEJE; data show 
(Figure 10) that radio filled an important gap.190  
An example: In Yamamoto Town (Miyagi Prefecture), Ringo (Apple) Radio 
was set up in the Town Hall with the help of a nearby FM station (Figure 11). The 
station began broadcasting March 21, about 10 days following the earthquake. 
187  World Bank Institute, Learning from Megadisasters: The Great East Japan Earthquake 
(Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012), 
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The station initially broadcast useful information such as bathing times and food 
rationing. Later, the station transitioned to a source of support and comfort to 
residents, serving as a vital lifeline to connect the community during a most trying 
time.191  
 
Figure 11.  Ringo Radio operating in Yamamoto Town Hall (from Shinjuku 
Daily Photo 2011) 
For the first week of the crisis, communities devastated by the disaster 
consistently cited radio as the most useful source of information.192 One factor 
was the Japanese government’s system, previously in place, to grant temporary 
emergency radio broadcasting licenses; 21 new disaster radio stations were 
established within a month of the earthquake.193 
Radio transmission became such an important channel that the federal 
government distributed 10,000 portable radios to evacuation centers and asked 
radio manufacturers—including Panasonic and Sony—to contribute another 
191 Shaw et al., Knowledge Note 3-2; Cluster 3: Emergency Response / Emergency 
Communication. 
192 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
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40,000+ radios.194 Car radios and battery-powered radios proved useful during 
the widespread power outages.195 
Use of radio presented its own challenges. Some local government radio 
channels were not available because of power outages and failure of backup 
systems. Another challenge to radio broadcasting was personnel. Immediately 
following the disaster, volunteer resources were abundant, but that number 
decreased over time, even though the help was still needed. A World Bank 
analysis concluded that a “substantial funding source” is needed to ensure radio 
broadcasting following a disaster.196 
Local community radio, having proved to be so valuable following the 
GEJE disaster, suffered financially. Some stations—including H@! FM and Radio 
Ishinomaki—lost significant revenue because they decided to not air commercial 
messages for weeks on end.197  
Area Number 3: Collapse of communications infrastructure. To 
overcome the lack of infrastructure, some people got inventive and went back to 
basics.  
When newspaper publishers faced damaged presses and power outages, 
some figured out a way to deliver the news in a new way. For example, Hibi 
Shimbun—the daily paper in Ishinomaki, Miyagi—sent its reporters out to collect 
information. Beginning the day after GEJE, the reporters produced handwritten 
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newsletters (Figure 12), which they posted to walls of evacuation centers.198 
After six days, the newspaper located a working computer printer and produced 
700 copies of the newsletter.199  
 
Figure 12.  Sample of the handwritten Ishinomaki Hibi Shimbun (from 
Consulate-General of Japan in Atlanta, 2011) 
Newsletters also proved an extremely useful method of getting information 
to those living in temporary shelters and evacuation centers. For example, CARE 
International supported several newsletter projects to connect friends and family 
who were separated and living in different evacuation centers.200 
198  Consulate-General of Japan in Atlanta, “Handwritten Newspapers Published by 
Ishinomaki Hibi Shimbun,” Consulate-General of Japan in Atlanta, http://www.atlanta.us.emb-
japan.go.jp/hts2.html. 
199 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
200  Ibid. 
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Nimbleness: Which channels worked best in various situations? For the 
most part, the means of communication varied from locality to locality, and 
changed as the disaster unfolded. The shifting nature of the disaster meant that, 
to be effective, people working in recovery efforts needed to be nimble, flexible, 
and sometimes innovative.  
For example, when newspapers were not able to produce printed papers, 
they were able to get information out online and via social media. Many 
increased their Twitter followers by tens of thousands.201 Other newspapers 
posted printed copies and some even posted handwritten newsletters.  
C. COMMUNICATIONS FAILURES 
Despite all the successes, the Japanese people struggled with numerous 
communications issues in the days, weeks and months following the GEJE 
disaster. One of the more problematic issues was the digital divide. Many 
residents in those communities that were most affected by the earthquake and 
tsunami were demographically older. And these older residents had less access 
to, or familiarity with, digital information options.202 Those with digital options had 
many more opportunities to access needed information, thus differentiating the 
“haves” and the “have-nots.” 
Public address systems worked well in some towns, but many were 
disabled by the earthquake or by power outage. This hindered tsunami warnings; 
many people died who did not receive later, updated warnings of the much 
higher tsunami estimates.203 Japan does have a robust system of public 
notifications, and indeed, the automatic earthquake warnings interrupted 
broadcast programming a few minutes before the earthquake hit. For the first few 
days, Japan’s major TV networks devoted more than 90 percent of their 





                                            
D. SUMMARY 
An analysis of Japan’s triple disaster in the context of the “high-tech, low-
tech, and no-tech” conceptual framework revealed communications successes 
for each of the three core communications issues.  
In the first area of fragile communications channels, a variety of high-tech 
solutions enabled people to keep in touch with other; social media tools were 
particularly useful. In the second area of Mismatched information, low-tech 
methods filled an important gap; local community radio was particularly helpful. In 
the third area of communications infrastructure collapse, people got inventive, 
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VII. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
All systems, all vestiges of modern living — communications, 
power, water — all are down. There is no way to communicate with 
the people. 
Philippine Interior Secretary Mar Roxas,  
following Typhoon Haiyan, 2013204 
 
This thesis project focused on answering the research question, looking 
for communications strategies to help emergency managers communicate 
important life/safety information with the public during major power outages. The 
project took place from the perspective of a researcher who has worked in the 
field of public relations, public affairs and communications for nearly 30 years, in 
private, public, and non-profit sectors. As Director of Communications for 
Arlington, Virginia, the researcher is responsible for countywide communications, 
including during emergencies.  
This research question came about because of frustrations experienced in 
trying to communicate information to constituents during major incidents that 
involve significant power outages. The anxiety level goes up even higher when 
the temperatures are extreme and the community needs critical life/safety 
information.  
A. EXAMINING THREE CORE COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 
The project looked at examined three diverse crises to look for ways that 
those communities handled the three core communications issues identified at 
the outset: fragile communications channels, Mismatched information, and 
collapse of communications infrastructure.  
204 Typhoon Haiyan hit the coast of the Philippines, November 8, 2013, killing thousands, 
Associated Press, “With Thousands Dead, Philippine Typhoon 'a Great Human Tragedy',” The 





                                            
Of the three cases, the 2003 Northeast Blackout was the least traumatic. 
Although it left 56 million people in the dark across eight U.S. states and two 
Canadian provinces, the duration of the blackout was much shorter than the 
other two cases. While people were greatly inconvenienced, the situation 
resolved itself fairly quickly when the power came back on, for the most part, in 
four days.  
The research validated the common-sense notion that, the longer the 
blackout, the worse the communications problems.  
A number of practical solutions emerged, across the cases, which have 
successfully addressed the three core communications areas. These solutions 
can help emergency managers now, as well as inform future research. A 
comparison of the three cases is described in this chapter and summarized in 
Appendix C. 
B. HIGH-TECH: DISCUSSION AND HURDLES 
For the core communications issue of fragile communications channels, 
the research showed that high-tech solutions have been successfully used.  
Telecommunication in the United States includes a large number of mobile 
technologies, including mobile phones, smart phones, tablets, and other mobile 
devices. And this usage is growing. At the end of 2012, Americans had more 
mobile devices than people; the U.S. had 326.4 million mobile devices,205 and a 
population of 315.1 million.206 This study examined how emergency managers 
can leverage these popular devices to help them communicate with the public 
during power outages. 
 
205 CTIA, “Wireless Quick Facts: Year-End Figures,” CTIA The Wireless Association, 
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/aid/10323. 
206 United States Census, “U.S. and World Population Clock,” U.S. Department of 
Commerce, http://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
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All three cases had high-tech elements that were successful. It makes 
sense that the most recent case (Japan’s 2011 GEJE) had the advantage of the 
most modern high-tech tools. Indeed, it turned out to be the case that Japan had 
more high-tech options, as well as successes. For Japan’s GEJE, the plethora of 
smart phones and use of social media produced many successes. 
Social media assisted with search and rescue efforts, helping to save 
lives. These networks also helped people find each other and helped get 
volunteers and relief efforts where they were needed. Because of these 
experiences, local Japanese governments in GEJE-affected areas now consider 
social networks a valuable tool in disasters. 
As the most recent case, the Japanese GEJE also showed the usefulness 
of smart phones, which were more widely used in 2011. These phones were able 
to access the Internet and social media tools during the disaster, making those 
platforms available to more people.  
The earlier cases (2003 Northeast Blackout and 2005 Hurricane Katrina) 
also had high-tech successes. In both cases, text messaging proved useful, as 
text messaging can more easily get through crowded mobile networks. These 
two earlier cases did not have social media successes, as these channels were 
not yet widely available. 
In all three cases, private efforts proved to be extremely valuable. From 
private instant-messaging services to setting up mobile and Internet networks to 
Google’s People Finder, private entities found ways to leverage their own 
technologies and expertise to benefit the disaster-stricken communities. As early 
as 2005, for the Katrina response, Yahoo!’s metasearch engine helped find 
missing persons and reunite families. 
Private entities helped with hardware, as well. Dell and other technology 
companies donated hundreds of computers to volunteer centers.  
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Hurdles: Full use of social media for emergency purposes in the U.S. 
faces a number of hurdles. Many officials resist the adoption of social media tools 
as legitimate communications channels. Some resist because these channels 
cannot be controlled; some because their agency has determined that unwieldy 
public records must be kept; some resist because they are “too busy” to take on 
another responsibility.  
Simple unfamiliarity may be the biggest hurdle of all.  At present, it is easy 
for emergency managers to dismiss Twitter, as many U.S. homeland security 
leaders are unfamiliar with this brave new digital world. For example, Professor 
Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, of Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security, one of the nation’s preeminent educators of homeland 
security leaders, posted to his Twitter feed on April 20, 2013, “Will 1201/1202 be 
the first cohort ever where no one joins twitter?!”  
 
Figure 13.  Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s Professor Rodrigo 
Nieto-Gomez Tweeted his concerns about students’ lack of interest in 
Twitter (from Twitter 2013) 
In the response to Japan’s GEJE, social media were very helpful but also 
created some headaches. Some Twitter posts, for example, continued to be re-
tweeted after the victims had been rescued, thus potentially diverting valuable 
rescue efforts. Disaster hash tags were also flooded with irrelevant information, 
creating a number of distracting posts. 
Successes in social media also resulted in some inequities. Older 
residents had less familiarity with, and access to, digital information options. 
Thus, social media resulted in the unintended consequence of creating the 
information “haves” and “have-nots.”  
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Other hurdles in the high-tech arena include resources; some of the high-
tech solutions require funds and all efforts require staff attention. Some may be 
eligible for grant funding, e.g., emergency alert systems, but others will have to 
compete for dwindling resources and multiple priorities. Another hurdle is simply 
the technology itself; for example, some outdoor warning systems operate by 
line-of-sight and are stymied by tall buildings.   
C. LOW-TECH: DISCUSSION AND HURDLES 
For the core communications area of Mismatched information, across all 
three cases, community radio was a real success story. These stations broadcast 
the hyper-local information that people needed, e.g., where to get water and 
shelter, and filled a very important gap. While network broadcast stations are 
engaged in wall-to-wall disaster coverage, they cannot focus attention on the 
hyper-local information needed on the neighborhood level.  
Community radio could be received by anyone with a radio, making this 
channel easily accessible. Radios are inexpensive and can be powered by 
batteries, solar, or hand-cranking. People also listened to car radios. After 
conditions improved, hyper-local community radio continued to broadcast, 
serving as a source of comfort and support to residents.  
Private efforts proved to be invaluable. In the Japan case, Panasonic, 
Sony and other manufacturers donated tens of thousands of battery-powered 
radios.  
Amateur “Ham” radio proved to be extremely valuable to emergency 
managers during the U.S. crises, by helping with communications between 
responders. By providing point-to-point communication, they played a valuable 
role in emergency management.  
Hurdles: The primary hurdle for community radio is finding an entity 
willing to create and run a hyper-local community radio station, if one does not 
already exist. Stations would have to be established ahead of a disaster and  
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apply for required FCC (Federal Communications Commission) licenses. 
Japanese regulations allow for speedy granting of temporary emergency radio 
broadcasting licenses, while FCC licensing windows open periodically for its 
hyper-local program, Low Power FM Broadcast Radio Stations.207 
A related hurdle is ensuring that community radio stations have sufficient 
funding to operate during disasters. A World Bank analysis concludes that a 
“substantial funding source” is needed to ensure radio broadcasting following a 
disaster.208 In a worst-case scenario, local government could stand up a radio-in-
a-box station after a disaster has occurred.  
Working with Ham radio operators does not present many hurdles; the 
Hams are accustomed to and regularly participate in drills and exercises, often in 
partnership with local responders. Hams do not broadcast to the public at large, 
and so are not able to assist with mass (public) communications, but they can be 
extremely helpful to first responders and point-to-point communications.  
D. NO-TECH: DISCUSSION AND HURDLES 
For the core communications area of infrastructure collapse, all three 
cases showed that, when all else fails, emergency managers could go back to 
basics. From handwritten posters to printed flyers to a bullhorn to just plain 
walking around and talking to people—emergency managers figured out what 
would work.  
Across the cases, posters and flyers were most useful when placed in 
popular gathering places. Here, too, private efforts were invaluable. In Japan, 
newspaper reporters and editors made heroic efforts to collect and distribute 
information.  
 
207 Federal Communications Commission, “Low Power FM Broadcast Radio Stations 
(LPFM),” Federal Communications Commission, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/low-power-fm-
broadcast-radio-stations-lpfm#WINDOWS. 
208 Rajib Shaw et al., Knowledge Note 3-2; Cluster 3: Emergency Response / Emergency 
Communication World Bank [2012]). 
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And as responders learned after Hurricane Katrina, using messengers 
proved a workable method of getting information from Point A to Point B. This 
method was successfully used in New Orleans, as it was during the 
Revolutionary War.  
Hurdles: The main hurdle is probably that no one wants to believe that a 
total catastrophe is likely to happen in our community. The Japanese no doubt 
never dreamed that an earthquake-tsunami-nuclear disaster would cripple a 
huge part of their country, devastating infrastructure and leaving thousands in the 
dark for months. The people of Grand Forks, North Dakota never thought they 
would totally lose their downtown and most of their infrastructure.  
If a town’s strategy is to prepare for the most likely events, it will not 
prepare for the “black swan” catastrophe—the high consequence, low probability 
event. The preparations, however, for the ‘no-tech” plan are modest and can 
easily be accomplished through existing resources, making this an affordable 
insurance policy.  
E. COMMUNICATIONS FAILURES 
There were common failures across the cases. Across all cases, what 
stopped working was basic communications infrastructure, including landline 
telephones, mobile phones, and even 911 services. It was clear that any entity 
that relied solely on “normal” communications methods was in trouble.  
Communications problems were mildest in the 2003 Blackout, principally 
due to the relatively short duration of the crisis. For the other two cases, 
however, lack of communications compounded other problems and thus became 
one of the most critical issues of the disaster.   
Across all cases, television media were not available or were severely 
disrupted. Under normal circumstances, this is a primary communications 
channel through which local governments can communicate with the public. 
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 However, the three cases show that this channel cannot be relied upon in the 
direst circumstances. In two of the cases, print media were not available or were 
severely disrupted.  
 
Figure 14.  Boston PD used Twitter to address misinformation following the 
Boston Marathon bombings (from Twitter 2013) 
In two of the cases, misinformation was also a problem for responders. 
Social media can help address misinformation, as it did with the April 2013 
bombings at the Boston Marathon. On April 17, 2013, widespread media reports, 
including Associated Press, announced that a suspect was in custody. With one 
Twitter post, the Boston Police Department was able to set the record straight 
(Figure 14).209  
F. OVERALL HURDLES 
Implementation of these “high-tech, low-tech, no-tech” solutions faces a 
number of general hurdles. One of the larger challenges may simply be time and 
resources. In recent years, all local governments have suffered ever-decreasing 
budgets, and staffs have had to assume more and more responsibilities. 
Consequently, local government staff people are very busy and no one needs 
“extra” work, and these efforts may be perceived as extra, unnecessary work.  
While many of the recommendations in this implementation plan are low-
cost or free, they still require time and attention to make them a reality.  See 
Appendix D for a recommended implementation plan and Appendix E for rough 
cost estimates.  




                                            
VIII. FINDINGS 
There is no fail-safe system.210 
 
In any disaster, communications are important. In the direst scenarios, 
when communications are more important than ever, damage to communications 
networks removes most normal communications channels.  
A. “HIGH-TECH, LOW-TECH, NO-TECH”: A THREE-PRONGED 
APPROACH 
The research shows that lack of communications is a critically important 
aspect of emergency management, response and recovery. Figuring out how to 
communicate with the public during crises is a goal worth pursuing, one for which 
it is worth investing and preparing.  
No one communications method can be guaranteed to work 100 percent 
of the time, throughout every disaster. Infrastructure has been and can be 
destroyed. Power outages can last days, weeks, or even months. It may not even 
be physically possible to drive a car on a street and broadcast information with a 
bullhorn. The point is: no single solution is the answer. A serious power outage 
can disable communications infrastructure. Severe weather can wipe out a town.  
To address a range of disasters, the “high-tech, low-tech, no-tech” 
approach would be a wise choice, one that boosts the chances of being able to 
communicate important information to the public. As discussed in Chapter VII, a 
blend of high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech can be a winning combination. If one 
category is not working, another may be available. This three-pronged approach 
addresses the three core communications issues identified and provides 
emergency managers with a needed plan. 
210 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
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Beware the “techno-fix”: In looking at disaster-related communications 
problems, it is natural to look for technical or infrastructure solutions. The review 
of the literature found many efforts focused on technical solutions. Two examples 
are COW (Cell on Wheels), which provides emergency mobile phone service, 
and Radio-in-a-Box, which is a self-contained unit with everything needed to 
stand up a local radio station.  
These are valuable, worthwhile efforts, but this research focused on how 
emergency managers can communicate now; not every community will be able 
to purchase robust technical solutions. Perhaps, with technological innovations, 
someday this research will be totally moot. That would be an excellent outcome. 
In the meantime, emergency managers must be prepared to communicate vital 
life-safety information to the public during a catastrophic disaster.  
And many observers caution that such “techno-fixes” can only go so far. 
Total failure of communications technology, as seen in Japan’s GEJE and 
Hurricane Katrina, showcased the vulnerabilities of an overreliance on technical 
solutions. In writing about crisis communications, Garnett and Kouzmin warned 
of the tendency to seek answers in the next technical solution, which they termed 
the “techno-fix.”211 No doubt some of these will be successful, but emergency 
managers cannot count solely on a techno-fix; they must be prepared to 
communicate with the community, particularly when disaster strikes.  
B. HIGH-TECH: ADDRESSING FRAGILE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS 
Emergency managers can leverage the high usage of mobile devices and 
exploit it for emergency communications purposes. For example, with more than 
500 million users, Twitter has become a leading source of information. Assuming 
emergency managers have access to backup generators, they can send out 
messages via social media channels. And people with access to powered 
devices would be able to receive the information. Local governments in the 
211 Garnett and Kouzmin, Communicating Throughout Katrina: Competing and 
Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Communication, 171–188. 
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disaster-affected areas of Japan’s triple disaster now consider social networks to 
be a valuable communications tool in disasters.212 
Smart phones enable use of social media. In the U.S., social media usage 
(61% of population) is much higher than it is in Japan (35%).213 Even with that 
lower participating percentage, social media proved to be very useful during 
Japan’s triple disaster.  
Clearly, smart phones have proven to be enormously useful during crises. 
To address affordability, some mobile phone companies have introduced 
inexpensive smart phones that could make them more affordable in the future. 
For example, the Chinese company Huawei announced it is selling a USD $80 
smart phone.214 
Emergency managers and communicators must go to where the people 
are, to get important messages across. To talk with soccer parents, it would be 
wise to walk over to the local soccer field; it would not be terribly effective to sit at 
a desk and shout toward the window. Similarly, today, to reach people in the 
community, it would be wise to go to where they are. And where they are today is 
on social media.  
On August 13, 2013, the National Capital Region’s Public Information 
Officers (PIOs) held their second annual Social Media in Emergency 
Management (#NCRsmem) Summit. The 150 PIOs in attendance agreed that 
social media are essential communications tools before, during and after 
disasters. They also agreed that these tools are essential for day-to-day needs, 
to establish them as trusted sources.  
212 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
213 Ed Carrasco, “Which Country Uses Social Media the most? (Infographic),” NMR - New 
Media Rockstars, http://newmediarockstars.com/2012/03/global-social-media-use/. 




                                            
In September, 2013, Twitter announced “Twitter Alerts,” a new feature to 
help people get important information during emergencies when “other 
communications services aren’t accessible.” The service will validate trusted 
sources, such as government agencies and first responders, for the “Twitter 
Alert” designation. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
Administrator Craig Fugate endorsed this feature, saying, “Social media has 
revolutionized communication during disasters.”215   
The move toward social media is inevitable; the only question is how 
soon. In the not-too-distant future, a new generation of homeland security 
leaders, who will be digital natives, will certainly push homeland security 
strategies into the digital age. The establishment of a trusted social media 
channel (e.g., Twitter) long before an emergency is essential to its success when 
the emergency strikes. 
And even absent social media, text messages sent via mobile phones or 
smart phones have a much higher probability of getting through during crises, as 
they require much smaller capacity than voice traffic.216  
These high-tech methods still require a mobile device to be able to be 
recharged. During emergencies, many communities enable recharging of devices 
at public facilities. As long as gasoline supplies are available, people can also 
recharge devices through their car’s electrical system.  
C. LOW-TECH: ADDRESSING MISMATCHED INFORMATION 
It was clear across the three cases that, whatever the situation—cause of 
the disaster, country, culture, and weather—what people needed most was 
extremely localized information. They needed to know where they could go for 
215 Bridget Coyne, “Introducing Twitter Alerts,” Twitter.com, 
https://blog.twitter.com/2013/introducing-twitter-alerts. 
216 Steve Dance, “Communications Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” 
Continuity Central: the international business continuity information portal, 
http://www.continuitycentral.com/feature1068.html. 
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shelter; where they could get relief supplies, including food and water; how they 
could find family and friends.  
Though hyper-local information was important in all three cases, it was 
more crucial in the more severe cases (i.e., Katrina and Japan’s GEJE). It makes 
sense that, the more dire the circumstances, the greater the need for practical 
information needed to live day-to-day. 
For a number of years now, Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, 
and state and local governments have been urging citizens to make emergency 
preparedness plans for themselves and their families. Despite these efforts, the 
level of preparedness is not as high as it should be. A 2012 national survey from 
Adelphi University Center for Health Innovation found that nearly half of adults do 
not have emergency supplies. And the findings suggest that Americans have a 
false sense of security; though more than 53 percent do not have a three-day 
supply of food and water, they believe they can survive in their homes for an 
average of 16 days.217  
These results suggest that many Americans are not prepared to take care 
of themselves for an extended disaster, and in a crisis, will require government 
and community assistance. Governments must figure out how they can 
communicate this vital information to the public in the direst circumstances. 
Across the cases, hyper-local community radio stations were among the 
top sources of extremely local information that people needed most. In addition, 
as conditions improved, hyper-local radio transitioned to sources of support and 
comfort, thus serving as vital lifelines to connect communities. In this way, local 
radio provided an intangible community benefit, in addition to its more obvious 
practical purposes. 




                                            
Although hyper-local radio is extremely valuable during crises, in our 
modern day-to-day world, it is seen as hopelessly boring and old-fashioned. 
Local radio stations can have resource challenges, including finances and 
volunteers. Local communities would be wise to invest in local radio partnerships 
to ensure they are functioning during disasters. The World Bank has made a 
recommendation for such a funding source for local radio, for exactly this 
reason.218 
Amateur “Ham” radio proved very valuable in the U.S. cases (Northeast 
Blackout and Katrina). As their primary function is point-to-point, they are very 
helpful to help communicate between responders; however, they do not 
broadcast to a mass audience and therefore, have not been emphasized here.  
D. NO-TECH: ADDRESSING COLLAPSE OF COMMUNICATIONS 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
When all else fails, local governments must be prepared to go backward 
and use old-fashioned methods to reach people with information. In all three 
cases, people used their ingenuity to figure out ways to get information to the 
people who needed it. The focus should be on getting information to the places 
where people naturally gather following disasters, e.g., corner stores, evacuation 
centers, gas stations.  
E. FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED  
Different disasters, different communities, and different audiences will call 
for using different tools.  
In times of emergency, emergency managers will need to be flexible, 
nimble, and inventive; they must be prepared to adapt quickly and use whatever 
communication method is working and available. Local governments would be 
prudent to establish policies that enable a wide variety of communications tools 
to be quickly put into place.   
218 Shaw et al., Knowledge Note 3-2; Cluster 3: Emergency Response / Emergency 
Communication. 
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An inventory would help to determine if governments have access to a 
wide variety of high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech solutions. For example, does the 
local jurisdiction have at least two photocopiers with access to emergency 
generator power and protection from flooding problems? And does it have good 
relationships with the next community over, in case its infrastructure is totally 
wiped out? (See Appendix D for a more detailed list of questions and suggested 
implementation plan). 
In his book, Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails, author Stephen 
Graham suggested that improvisation is an essential skill for emergency 
managers and first responders. He recommended emergency response 
exercises in which infrastructure is not available, so responders can learn how to 
develop workarounds.219 
Above all, the “high-tech, low-tech, no-tech” approach requires agility—the 
ability to quickly move to a different solution. This could prove problematic. For 
example, the U.S. Congressional report on the Hurricane Katrina response 
concluded that all levels of government lack “flexibility and adaptability,” which 
often delay the response.220 
F. PRIVATE EFFORTS 
The public sector shouldered an enormous load in each of the three 
cases, but the private sector and the non-profit sector made invaluable 
contributions and are essential to emergency response. Private companies 
donated tangible goods, including computers, batteries, radios and flashlights, as 
well as services, expertise, and volunteers.  
219 Graham, Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails. 
220 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
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In many cases, private and non-profit entities saw a need and jumped in to 
fill it, including building ways in which displaced persons could find each other, 
and building crowdsourcing tools to aid the emergency response.  
Google, for example, is looking at way to assist elderly persons in future 
emergencies. One idea is to use evacuation centers as information hubs, 
providing computers and assistance to those who need the help.221 
These efforts are priceless and we must encourage, embrace, and nurture 
them.  
G. ADDRESSING A GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
Why is so difficult to find emergency operations plans that include 
planning for communicating during scenarios that include catastrophic loss of 
power? The answer is not clear. Perhaps emergency managers are planning for 
the more likely scenarios, not the direst ones. Emergency managers may also be 
betting on a “techno-fix.”  
Many after-action reports focused on communications between 
responders, or between agencies, or between political entities and the media. It 
is curious, but many reports acknowledged the importance of communicating 
with the public, but did not specify any ideas on how this might be accomplished. 
This research addressed this gap. 
H. PREPARING FOR THE WORST 
These days, everyone is very busy and no one needs “extra” work. But the 
consequences of being unable to deliver critical life/safety information to our 
communities can be devastating. By preparing for the worst, emergency 
managers can be as prepared as possible to weather the next disaster. 
How long will it take to implement this plan? Many items could be 
implemented very quickly, and others have a longer-term horizon. For example, it 
221  Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East 
Japan Earthquake. 
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takes mere minutes to establish a Twitter or Facebook account, yet establishing 
a culture and practice of continuous two-way outreach is a longer-term 
proposition for a locality. 
Many communities already have established excellent relations with its 
hyper-local radio station and its Ham operators; others may need to take the time 
to nurture those relationships. The purchasing of bigger-ticket items, such as 
emergency alert system or outdoor warning system, is a strategic decision that 
must be handled as a priority budget request or grant application.  
What does success look like? Emergency managers will be successful if, 
during the next devastating power outage, they are able to communicate critical 
life-safety information to the people who need it most. Success could mean the 
difference between life and death for people shaken by a devastating disaster.  
Having prepared for the worst, emergency managers can be ready to use 
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IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Great East Japan Earthquake also corroborates 
evidence drawn from other major disasters: that 
information saves lives, that communication itself is a 
form of aid.222 
 
This research project has shown that it is possible for localities to prepare 
for the worst—to be able to communicate critical life-safety information to the 
public during a major power outage, even when communications infrastructure 
has collapsed.  
The researcher discovered a gap in the literature. The literature is clear 
that communicating with the public during a crisis is a vital part of emergency 
response and recovery. Yet specific recommendations on how communities and 
emergency managers can go about accomplishing this important task are few 
and far between.  
The research project bridged that gap, through a conceptual framework of 
“high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech” solutions to address three core 
communications areas: fragile communications channels, Mismatched 
information, and collapse of infrastructure. By examining three major disasters, 
the research confirmed that emergency managers could use the three-pronged 
“high-low-no-tech” plan to communicate with their publics. This “high-low-no-
tech” plan comprises methods and technologies that currently exist, have worked 
successfully in the past, and are affordable.  
What is new about this proposal? None of these methods is revolutionary; 
all are well known, well used and exist in virtually every community in America. 
All have been proven to work effectively in recent major disasters.  
 
222 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
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What is new is the proposal that emergency managers in local 
jurisdictions proactively prepare for the worst scenarios, by making preparations 
for communicating with their public, via the “high-tech, low-tech, no-tech” 
combination. Key elements for success include: 
• Focusing on the hyper-local information that people need 
• Flexibility to quickly adapt and use those tools and channels that 
are up and working 
• Nurturing and encouraging private efforts to help in response and 
relief efforts 
• Preparing for the worst 
• Not relying on a “techno-fix”  
People are inventive and can come up ingenious solutions (see Figure 
15). Often, government policies do not leave much room for imagination or 
deviation from the authorized plan or policy. When the crisis is extreme, 
governments must be flexible enough and nimble enough to use whatever will 
work, even if it does not fit the official policy.  
 
Figure 15.  Ryan Nelsen (right) and Fields Harrington (second from right) 
pedaled a tandem bicycle to generate power as people wait for their cell 
phones to recharge on Avenue C in the East Village of Manhattan, in New 
York. Following Hurricane Sandy, this neighborhood had no electrical 




Continuity of Operations: These recommendations dovetail well into 
FEMA’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Templates, which urge 
“communications systems needed to ensure connectivity during crisis and 
disaster conditions.”223 Local emergency managers should consider 
implementing the “high-low-no-tech” approach to fulfill the communications needs 
of their Continuity of Operations Plans, thus ensuring the availability of 
communications with the public in all conditions.  
To take this a step farther, FEMA should consider incorporating the “high-
low-no-tech” approach into the COOP template, which currently assumes that 
communications systems—phones, Internet, email, two-way radios—will be 
operational within 12 hours of activation. As this study has shown, this 
assumption is not always possible.  
A. IMPLEMENTING “HIGH-TECH, LOW-TECH, NO-TECH” APPROACH 
How could localities go about implementing this three-pronged approach? 
Appendix D described a plan crafted for one community (“the City”) to enable a 
wide variety of communications tools to be quickly put into place. The plan can 
easily be replicated in other communities, or scaled up or down, depending on 
particular community needs. 
Embracing use of the different tools recommended here will require 
understanding, agreement, commitment and buy-in from senior management. 
For example, many observers have hailed Boston Police Department’s 
successful use of Twitter in the aftermath of the April 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombings. The success in large part is due to commitment from that 




223 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Continuity Plan Template for Non-
Federal Entities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security [2011]). 
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@deputydaley) Tweets from his own account as well as from the department’s 
account (@Boston_Police). Thanks to Twitter, Boston Police was able quickly to 
squash erroneous rumors.224  
Appendix E described rough cost estimates for the implementation plan.  
Those in rural areas may find these recommendations are more 
appropriate for urban areas. However, rural areas should find at least some of 
these findings and recommendations to be useful in preparing for the worst.   
B. LIMITATIONS  
The only constant is change. 
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.535-475 B.C.) 
 
This research project was limited to open-source, published writings, 
including reports, journal articles, and media stories. While it represents a robust 
search of open sources, it does not capture every possible method, solution, or 
idea. The design of this research included a number of limitations.  
• Limited information. The project was limited to the review of three 
chosen cases. While the attempt was made to choose diverse 
cases, the information and scope were limited to the finite data 
reviewed. The study did not include any blackout crises caused by 
nefarious means, i.e., terrorism. The research was also limited to 
unclassified information that was reported in various written forms.  
• Focused on developed society. All information in the study came 
from experiences in the developed world. While there may be some 
successful tactics in undeveloped societies, these were not studied.  
• No new innovations. This study is limited to communications 
channels that are currently widely available to emergency 
managers; it did not include looking for new innovations or 
technologies. It was biased toward communications tools and 
channels that are widely used and relatively inexpensive. The study 
did not include any efforts to harden the power grid or 
communications infrastructure, such as COW (Cell on Wheels), a 
224 Greg Licamele, “Government as Evocative and Provocative Publishers,” The Digital PIO, 
http://digitalpio.wordpress.com/category/smem/. 
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mobile cellular phone site. While these are worthwhile efforts, they 
were not studied in this project. 
• Ignores communications between responders. This study 
focused on emergency managers’ ability to communicate with the 
public and, with few exceptions, ignored any issues that first 
responders have in communicating amongst themselves. Also, with 
a few exceptions, the study ignored the public’s ability to 
communicate with responders, emergency managers, and each 
other. 
• Ignores jurisdictional authority. The study did not address which 
agency, governing body, or emergency management agency has 
the authority or operational command for incident management and 
communications.  
• No funding consideration. The study did not take into 
consideration any budgetary constraints or needs, though the 
emphasis within the study was on channels that were free or of 
relatively low cost.  
• Ignores ownership. The study did not take into consideration what 
entity owns any particular tool or channel, including electric or 
telephone companies. It also was agnostic toward assets owned by 
public or private entities. 
• No consideration of skills. The study did not consider any special 
skills that might be needed for emergency managers to implement 
the recommendations. 
• Short shelf life. Technical innovations come about quickly; new, 
inexpensive solutions will become available and this research will 
quickly become outdated.  
Despite these limitations, this research project filled an important research 
gap and gives emergency managers a number of free or low-cost options to use 
during major blackouts. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research will quickly become outdated. At the time of Hurricane 
Katrina (2005), MySpace was the most popular social media tool, Facebook was 
limited to college campuses, and Twitter had not been invented. At the time of 
this publication just eight years later, MySpace now occupies a niche in music 
and entertainment, shares in Facebook and Twitter are publicly-traded and many 
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people who work in emergency management are calling Twitter the top crisis 
communications tool. Technology evolves rapidly. 
In no time, the next big communications tool will be here and the tools 
described here will be laughably outdated. Future researchers will be able to 
analyze new technologies and tools as they become available, and make 
recommendations to new generations of responders.  
What is not likely to change quickly is society’s dependence on electricity 
and the fragility of the power grid. What is not likely to change quickly is the need 
for “high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech” methods, so that emergency managers can 
reach the public with important information. What is not likely to change quickly is 
the need for responders to be nimble, and to be prepared to use whatever tools 
are up and working when faced with a disaster.  
In future years, no doubt new technologies and solutions will be available. 
On June 14, 2013, Google announced that it launched 30 giant helium balloons 
into the air over New Zealand. Circling 12 miles above Earth, the balloons were 
equipped to send wireless Internet signals below, providing free access to rural 
areas.225  
It is hoped that, in the future, such technology may be able to provide 
Internet service when an area has lost communications. While some 
technologies are promising, emergency managers and localities still must be 
ready for today’s scenarios, with today’s solutions. 
 
 
225 Cecilia Kang, “Google to use Balloons to Provide Free Internet Access to Remote Or 




                                            
APPENDIX A.  DEFINITIONS 
Terms integral to, and appearing throughout, this thesis are defined here.  
Power outage and blackout are used interchangeably for the disruption 
of electric power to a community; the focus was on major disruptions. 
Emergency manager referred to state and local government emergency 
managers and responders who are responsible for managing crises. The project 
used the context of the Incident Command System (ICS), which includes a core 
component of public information.  
Public communication and life/safety information referred to important 
life/safety information that community members need to remain healthy and keep 
their families safe. This included, for example, information on where the toxic 
plume is headed, where they can get untainted food and water, where they can 
go for shelter. This is information that, under ICS, emergency managers must 
convey to the community, as well as the various channels/methods used to push 
out the information. This study did not look at communications among first 
responders, or between members of the community. 
Availability referred to communications channels that currently exist, that 
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APPENDIX B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Additional research questions helped to answer the overall research 
question: 
What high-tech, low-tech, and no-tech communication strategies can 
support public communications during large-scale power outages?  
 
Research question How question helped to 
answer overall research 
question 
How question led to 
analysis, findings, and 
conclusion 
1. What happened? What is 
the basic description of 
the incident? 
All cases involved a large-
scale power outage across a 
wide swath of the community, 
for an extended period of time; 
in two cases, this was a period 
of some months.  
The “high-low-no-tech” 
approach should be 
incorporated into COOP plans 
and into FEMA’s COOP 
templates.
226  
2. How were 
communications 
impacted? Were any 
channels open / 
available? 
Failure of normal 
communications channels 
greatly impacted all cases, 
worsening the crises. In each 
case, successful outcomes 
arose in high-tech, low-tech, 
and no-tech solutions. 
Emergency managers must be 
prepared for the direst 
situations, even the less likely 
ones. 
3. How did the public receive 
important information 
during the crisis? 
Normal channels were 
inoperable; successes 
covered the gamut from high-
tech, low-tech, and no-tech 
solutions. 
Free or low-cost solutions 
proved workable. Low-tech 
community radio was valuable 
across the cases to share 
hyper-local information. No-
tech flyers helped in the direst 
situations. 
4. What went well? What 
factors were present that 
affected the outcome in a 
positive way? 
The more recent cases 
showed the value of smart 
phones and social media. 
Private efforts were extremely 
valuable across the cases. 
Successes required 
emergency managers to be 
creative and flexible. The 
longer the blackout, the worse 
the communications problems. 
5. What went poorly? What 
factors were present that 
affected the outcome in a 
negative way? 
Traditional media and 
communications methods 
cannot be relied on. People 
still needed to be able to 





Misinformation was a problem; 
in some instances, social 
media and community radio 
helped correct misinformation. 
226 COOP = Continuity of Operations; FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
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Research question How question helped to 
answer overall research 
question 
How question led to 
analysis, findings, and 
conclusion 
6. What are the lessons 
learned? Any good ideas / 
solutions that emerged? 
Did people make use of 
“old-school” methods and, 
if so, how were they 
used? Did people make 
use of new technologies 
and, if so, how were they 
used? 
The cases revealed that 
people creatively used the 
gamut of high-tech, low-tech, 
and no-tech methods. The 
researcher had anticipated 
high-tech and no-tech 
solutions, but the discovery of 
low-tech methods was a 
pleasant surprise.  
Emergency managers must 
prepare for the direst 
circumstances and not rely 
solely on a “techno-fix.” What 
is new is the recommendation 
that emergency managers be 
prepared for the direst 
circumstances, with a range of 
communications options.  
7. What is the relationship 
between people’s level of 
technical dependence and 
their resilience during 
severe power outages?  
Those with less access to 
Internet, mobile devices 
(particularly elderly residents) 
were disadvantaged; low-tech 
and no-tech solutions were 
needed to reach them. 
Future technologies may solve 
these problems; in the 
meantime, emergency 
managers must be prepared 
for today’s challenges. 
Table 1.   Additional research questions helped to answer the overall 
research question 
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APPENDIX C.  HIGH-LOW-NO-TECH SOLUTIONS  
An at-a-glance comparison of how “high-low-no-tech” solutions helped to 
address the three identified problem areas.  
 






    
High-tech x   
Text messaging x   
Social media x x x 
Internet tools x   
Private efforts x   
Alert systems x x  
Smart phones x  x 
    
Low-tech    
Local radio  x  
Amateur “Ham” radio  x  
Print media  x  
    
No-tech    
Handwritten   x 
Flyers  x x 
    
Table 2.   An at-a-glance comparison of “high-low-no-tech” solutions  
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APPENDIX D.  IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
How could localities go about implementing this three-pronged approach? 
The plan described here is crafted for one community (“the City”) to enable a 
wide variety of communications tools to be quickly put into place. The plan can 
easily be replicated in other communities, or scaled up to cover a wider 
geography.  
The “high-low-no-tech” implementation plan is described here; cost 
estimates for this plan are included in Appendix E.   
1. Overall Preparations 
Overall, emergency managers should embrace a “system of systems” to 
address a range of disasters. Steps to get there: 
• Take inventory of current communications channels to ascertain 
access to a variety of solutions. These questions may be helpful: 
• Does the City have access to high-tech channels, 
particularly social media channels and text messaging?  
• Does the City have access to low-tech channels, particularly 
hyper-local community radio, and amateur radio? 
• Is the City prepared to mobilize no-tech solutions, 
particularly the ability to print flyers and distribute them?  
• Educate senior leadership and staff about the need to be prepared 
for all scenarios, including total loss of infrastructure.  
• Establish and/or augment staff training and exercises to include 
public communications needs, particularly when the situation is at 
its most dire.  
• Exercises should include elements that require flexibility; 
after all, emergency managers will not know exactly which 
communications channels will be available to them in every 
scenario. 
• The City can also hold emergency preparedness exercises 
with the community. For example, hold a community tabletop 
exercise on a severe, multi-day power outage and invite the 
public and stakeholders, including the power company. 
 99 
Once the City has conducted its communications inventory, it can begin to 
assess next steps for each of the three prongs—high-tech, low-tech, and no-
tech.  
2. High-Tech Plan 
Social media: City government should adopt policies that embrace the 
use of social media channels, not only for emergencies, but also for day-to-day 
needs, to establish them as trusted sources. Local governments in the disaster-
affected areas of Japan’s GEJE (Great East Japan Earthquake) now consider 
social networks to be a valuable communications tool in disasters.227  
• Does the City currently use social media channels, e.g., Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube? If not, set them up and begin using them now, 
because once a crisis strikes, it will be too late to create the 
accounts and build a following.  
• Perhaps some City agencies already use these channels 
and can be of assistance. Often, Public Information Officers 
(PIOs) have communications skills that lend themselves to 
this task. The Maryland Emergency Management Agency 
includes social media skills in its routine training for PIOs.228  
• The City’s Emergency Communications Center (911 center) 
should make contingency plans to monitor Twitter, in the 
event of total loss of 911 telephone service.  
• Better yet, the City should consider implementing Next 
Generation 911, through which people can contact the 911 
center by phone, text message, Twitter, video, or 
Facebook.229  
227 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
228 Kim Stephens, “Maryland Emergency Management Agency Plans for #SMEM,” iDisaster 
2.0: Social Media and Emergency Management, 
http://idisaster.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/maryland-emergency-management-agency-plans-for-
smem/. 
229 WJZ-TV, “Maryland Offers Residents Option to Contact 911 by Twitter and Text 
Messages,” CBS Baltimore, July 15, 2012, http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2012/07/15/new-
technology-makes-it-easier-to-contact-911/. 
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• The City should consider setting social media policies for internal 
staff use of the tools, as well as Terms of Use for users.230 
• The City can recruit and prepare to leverage a cadre of digital 
volunteers to help monitor and manage social media accounts 
during a crisis.  
• The City can also consider use of crowdsourcing tools for 
situational awareness and real-time information inputs from the 
public.  
• For example, for 2012’s Hurricane Sandy, Fairfax County, 
Virginia launched a crowdsourced map to help collect 
information on downed trees, flooding, and traffic lights 
out.231 This type of map also helps provide residents with 
useful information on affected areas, damage, flooding, 
shelters, etc.  
• In 2013, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
launched “Disaster Reporter,”232 a crowdsourcing tool to 
aggregate reports from the public; this could prove very 
useful for local emergency managers.  
While the cost of the social media platforms is generally free, staff time 
must be devoted to these efforts. As more City agencies join social media, the 
City should consider purchasing access to software to help it manage all social 
media accounts across the enterprise. For example, HootSuite and Sendible 
offer services to enable easier management of multiple accounts.  
Emergency alerting service: When mobile traffic overwhelms cellular 
networks, often text messages can still get through. This type of service enables 
emergency managers to send emergency text messages to mobile devices and 
email accounts. For example, the localities of the National Capital Region (NCR) 
230 Arlington Virginia, “Social Media General Terms of Use,” Arlington, Virginia Newsroom, 
http://news.arlingtonva.us/social-media-general-terms-of-use. 
231 Fairfax County, “Fairfax County Reporting Map (Beta),” Fairfax County, Virginia, 
https://fairfaxcountysandy.crowdmap.com. 
232 FEMA’s new crowdsourcing tool is free for local emergency managers’ use. See 
http://www.fema.gov/disaster-reporter.  
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have banded together to coordinate and encourage residents to sign up for free 
alert service where they live and work.233  
• Does the City already have an emergency alert service? If so, are 
relevant staff trained and experienced with using the system? 
• If the City does not have such a service, it should seriously 
consider obtaining and implementing one.234 A number of 
contractors offer such services; be sure to choose one that is 
robust and has sufficient power backup.  
• The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), together with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the wireless 
phone industry, manages the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) 
program.235 This enables emergency managers to send text 
messages to mobile customers serviced by a particular cell tower, 
thus not requiring the customers to opt-in. In the National Capital 
Region, for example, the National Weather Service is using WEA to 
send urgent alerts of tornado and other dangerous weather 
conditions. Local governments can also gain access to use the 
system for localized alerts and should incorporate this useful tool 
into emergency plans. 
Outdoor warning systems: The City may also wish to consider installing 
an outdoor warning system to be able to get out hyper-local information. Modern 
warning systems enable voice instructions, in addition to a siren sound, as well 
as silent testing. This type of system may be especially useful in an urban 
environment. 
Directing digital traffic: During emergencies, telephone and mobile 
networks are usually quickly overwhelmed. 
• As part of its preparedness efforts, the City can encourage people 
to use text messaging and email during critical emergencies, as 
well as limit their phone usage. (The National Capital Region is 
considering just such an educational campaign.)  
233 National Capital Region, “CAPITALERT: Washington, DC Region Emergency Alert 
Services,” Governments of the National Capital Region, http://www.capitalert.gov. 
234 The governments of the National Capital Region use the RoamSecure (RSAN) platform 
from Cooper Notification. 
235 Federal Communications Commission, “Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA),” U.S. 
Government, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/wireless-emergency-alerts-wea. 
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• The City can also assist lobbying efforts to encourage the U.S. 
federal government to adopt policies to enable prioritization of 
emergency voice traffic. 
Private efforts:  Governments should also embrace and support private 
efforts.  
• Google, for example, is looking at way to assist elderly persons in 
future emergencies. One idea is to use evacuation centers as 
information hubs, providing computers and assistance to those who 
need the help.236 
3. Low-Tech Plan 
The primary focus for low-tech options is radio. 
Hyper-local community radio: In previous disasters, local radio has 
proven extremely helpful; in many instances, local radio has been the primary 
way that residents have received valuable information. Every household should 
have a wind-up radio.  
• Does the City have existing local community radio stations? If so, 
the City should establish solid working relationships with station 
management to ensure smooth operations during an emergency. 
• The City should also consider subsidizing these hyper-local 
stations to ensure they will be there for the next disaster and 
ready to broadcast, as recommended by the World Bank.237 
• If there are no such existing radio stations, can the City identify a 
non-profit group that would be willing to create and manage one?  
• Current Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
approval processes do not allow for the rapid stand-up of 
local radio, so these stations and relationships should be 
established well ahead of when they are needed. 
• The City can consider purchasing “Radio-in-a-Box” 
technology, which provides everything needed for radio 
236 Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. 
237 Shaw et al., Knowledge Note 3-2; Cluster 3: Emergency Response / Emergency 
Communication. 
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broadcast in one relatively inexpensive box238 (see Figure 
16). 
• Preparations, policies and exercises can be put into place 
similar to those already in place to partner with local amateur 
radio—a.k.a. “ham” radio—operators. 
 
Figure 16.  Proteus ‘Radio in a Box’ (from In a Box Innovations 2013) 
Amateur “Ham” radio: Ham radio has also proven to be extremely 
valuable during emergencies. Ham radio operators primarily assist with point-to-
point communications, and do not broadcast to a mass audience. They are, 
however, very helpful to responders; across the United States, thousands of Ham 
operators have earned their permits after passing stringent testing. 
• Does the City have existing relationships with local Hams? If so, 
these relationships should be strengthened and Hams should 
exercise regularly with City emergency managers.  
• Hams have been extremely valuable in helping with 
communications between first responders, emergency 
managers, and critical facilities such as hospitals; these 
partners should also be involved with the exercises. 
• If relationships do not currently exist, the City should recruit 
and nurture relationships with local Hams. This can easily be 
accomplished through the American Radio Relay League, 
the national association for amateur radio.  
238 Rukmin Wijemanne, “In a Box Innovations,” In a Box Innovations, 
http://www.inaboxinnovations.com.au. 
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4. No-Tech Plan 
The City also must make preparations for the direst circumstances, which 
could include total loss of infrastructure. What channels could be available for 
emergency managers to use to communicate with the public? The “no-tech” 
option also helps close the “digital divide,” by providing information to those who 
may not have access or use smart phone technology. 
Posted flyers: If all else fails, the City should be prepared to post flyers 
with critical information, ideally, at places where people gather. When a massive 
flood wiped out Grand Forks, North Dakota in 1997, the town stood up a Public 
Information Center, which used old-fashioned newsletters to communicate with 
thousands of people living in FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
trailers.239 
• The City’s emergency managers should compile a list of possible 
venues at which they can post information; this list will serve as a 
starting point. 
• This list can include City libraries, community centers, fire 
stations, government center, etc. This should also include 
places where people will naturally gather, e.g., grocery 
stories, gas stations, convenience stores, evacuation 
centers, shelters.  
• Keep in mind that you will have to remain flexible, as it will 
depend on which venues are actually available and open 
after the disaster.  
• The City may have existing relationships with volunteer 
groups who could take on responsibilities for helping to 
distribute flyers around town.  
• Does the City have at least two photocopiers with access to 
emergency generator power and protection from flooding 
problems? If not, can you make arrangements with 2-3 nearby 
towns for backup printing assistance? 
• Similar backup arrangements for use of computers would 
also be helpful for the writing of flyers.   
239  City of Grand Forks, Grand Forks Flood Disaster and Recovery Lessons Learned, City 
of Grand Forks, North Dakota, 2011). http://www.grandforksgov.com/Reports/lessonslearned.pdf. 
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• Does the City have existing robust relationships with other nearby 
localities? Such relationships, created and nurtured well before an 
emergency, could prove invaluable should such “mutual aid” be 
needed for a no-tech communications scenario.  
• The City should also consider stocking plastic folders or protective 
sleeves, in order to protect posted flyers that must be posted 
outside.  
Other options:  Can include using a bullhorn or the broadcast systems in 
public safety vehicles. If the U.S. Postal Service is working (and people have 
houses and mailboxes), a mailed letter/card is another option. However, some of 
these involve electricity in some form, e.g., finding a photocopier or printer that 
has access to electric power.  
• Could the City partner with non-profits or volunteer groups to help 
create an information outreach program? Nurturing these 
relationships before an emergency would be invaluable. 
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APPENDIX E.  COST ESTIMATES FOR IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The “high-low-no-tech” implementation plan is described in Appendix D; 
cost estimates for this plan are described here. Cost estimates are one-time, 
unless noted otherwise. Cost estimates vary widely, depending on strategic 




Cost Estimates  
Notes 
Overall preparations 
Take inventory $0 Existing staff should be able to take 
this on as a project. 
Educate senior leadership $0 Existing staff should be able to help 
leadership understand the 
importance of the project. 
Establish/augment training $0 - $25,000 Existing staff can take this on, or the 
City can hire a contractor. 
High-tech plan 
Establish and manage social media 




The tools are free to set up and the 
City can identify existing staff to 
manage the accounts. Or, the City 
can hire a contractor or additional 
staff.  
Tool to manage multiple social media 
accounts 
$5,000+ /year Enables staff to easily manage 
multiple City accounts. 




Existing staff can handle this task. 
Or, the City can hire a contractor or 
additional staff. 
Next Generation 911 +/- $7 million In 2012, Montgomery County, MD 
paid $7 million for its system. 
Establish social media policies $0 Can be handled internally. 
Crowdsourcing tools $0 - 
$100,000/year 
Most tools are free to set up and the 
City can identify existing staff to 
manage the accounts. Or, the City 
can hire a contractor or additional 
staff. 
Emergency text alert service +/- $500,000 One-year cost for National Capital 
Region (population of 5.8 million) is 
$735,000 for Cooper Notification’s 
RSAN service. May be eligible for 





Cost Estimates  
Notes 
Outdoor warning system +/- $1 million In 2007, Dallas purchased a system 
for $3.3 million that consists of 153 
sirens that cover 95% of the city. 
May be eligible for grant funding. 
Directing digital traffic $0 - $50,000 City can use normal 
communications channels, and can 
engage in an advertising campaign. 
Lobbying efforts can be handled 
regionally, or through national 
associations. 
Low-tech plan 
Subsidize community radio $12,000 - 
$120,000/year 
Depends on station’s financial 
stability and City’s willingness to 
subsidize. 
Radio-in-a-box +/- $10,000 Online quote for product from In a 
Box Innovations is $12,500. 
Recruit and nurture Ham radio 
operators 
$0 - $12,000/year Conduct regular drills and 
exercises. 
No-tech plan 
Compile list of venues $0 Can be accomplished by existing 
staff. 
Photocopiers with emergency backup 
power 
$0 - $25,000+ Some equipment or infrastructure 
purchases may be desired. 
Partner with non-profit groups $0 - $10,000+ City may wish to consider some 
small grants to ensure participation 
when needed. 
Relationships with other localities $0 Relationships can be started and 
nurtured with existing resources. 
Plastic folders $100 - $1,000 Depends on quantities needed for 
number of target venues. 
Table 3.   Cost estimates to implement the high-low-no-tech plan 
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